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I. INTRODUCTION: GENEVA CRENSHAW'S COMPLAINT
It is incredible that our people's faith could have brought them so much they
sought in the law and left them with so little they need in life.
It is so unfair. Like the crusaders of old we sought our Holy Grail of "equal oppor-
tunity," and having gained it in court decisions and civil rights statutes, found the
quest to be for naught. Equal opportunity, far from being the means of achieving
racial equality, has become yet another device for perpetuating the racial status
quo.'
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.S. 1973, Union College; J.D.,
1976, New York University. This paper, in a more embryonic form, was presented at the Critical
Race Theory Workshop in Boulder, Colo., June, 1991. My greatest debt is to this small, brilliant
group. Many thanks therefore to Mari Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Linda Green, Harlan Dalton, Tanya
Banks, Neil Gotanda, and Gerald Torres. I also wish to thank my colleagues at the University of
Miami who provided many valuable criticisms and insights. I am especially grateful for the assis-
tance of Steven Winter, Mary Coombs, Pat Gudridge, Minnette Massey, Ken Casebeer, Michael
Fischl, Terry Anderson, and Richard Mendales. I also wish to thank Robert Linnehan for valuable
research assistance.
1. Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 was hailed as the most
important legislation of the twentieth century.3 And within the deep
symbolism 4 of our civil rights discourse this, of course, was true. Title
VII represented not merely a set of antidiscrimination rules, but a
break with history. It was both a centerpiece and an emblem of a kind
of second reconstruction 5 in which America determined to rise above
HARV. L. REv. 4, 16 (1985) In the Chronicles, Bell examines the tension between the commitment
to equality implicit in our constitutionalism and the predicament of blacks. Bell merges the genres
of literature and legal scholarship to use narrative as the primary vehicle of his discussion. Geneva
Crenshaw is one of the characters Bell creates in his narrative.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)). Title VII prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
3. "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the most important civil rights legislation of this cen-
tury. Title VII of that Act... has been its most important part." Norbert Schlei, Foreword to
BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW at vii (2d ed. 1983).
4. Civil rights laws in our secular culture play a role analogous to that of a sacred text. The
sacred text is one "that, in the community and tradition in question, is seen to charter, to man-
date, the form of life to which the community and tradition aspire, and thus the text that, for the
community and tradition, symbolizes that mandate." Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 558
(1985). Civil rights laws give textual form to egalitarian and democratic values which are seen to
"charter and mandate" our political and legal forms. As text, they "symbolize that mandate." Fur-
ther, civil rights laws represent the connection between the legal sphere of American life and, if not
a spiritual sphere, at least a normative sphere or nomos. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the
Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (arguing that the discovery of this connection is the chief project
of legal interpretation). However, the source of the connection, I think, reposes only within human-
itarian laws, such as laws to protect minorities. It is this bridge within the American political order
between its legal institutions and its moral institutions which not only legitimates that political
order but distinguishes it from others. "This was the first nation in the history of the world to be
founded with a purpose. The great phrases of that purpose still sound in every American heart,
North and South: 'AU men are created equal'." President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to
the Congress: The American Promise (March 15, 1965), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965 at 281, 282 (1966).
5. Reconstruction is the period of American history following the Civil War in which Con-
gress enacted a panoply of civil rights protections on behalf of blacks (including the 13th, 14th and
15th Amendments) and stationed troops in the South to enforce them. Eric Foner dates this pe-
riod from 1867 (when "Radical Republicans" in Congress "swept away southern governments and
fastened black suffrage upon the defeated south") to 1877 (the date of the Hayes-Tilden Compro-
mise, when in exchange for favorable resolution of a dispute over the presidency the Republicans
agreed to remove the northern troops which had enforced civil rights laws). See ERIC FONER, pref-
ace to RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION at xix (1988). After the Hayes-Tilden
compromise of 1877, many of the gains made by blacks were largely swept away, and the Civil
Rights protections enacted by Congress fell into desuetude. A number of scholars have suggested a
parallel between the period of reconstruction following the civil war and the period following
World War II. See MANNING MARABLE, RACE REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1982 at 168-99 (1984); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1115 (1991) (referring to the 'Second Reconstruction' of
the 1960s); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM L. REv. 1622, 1624 n.10 (1986) (referring to the period "occurr[ing]
between approximately 1954 and 1968 when legislation, court decisions, and mass protests, dis-
mantled much of the legal apparatus of the Jim Crow system"); see also Derrick Bell, Xerces and
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the racism of the past and to resurrect ideals dormant since inception.6
If discrimination in the workplace was a stone in the path of national
progress, Title VII would be the instrument by which it was rolled
away.
Title VII reflected for America a new sense of national identity, an
America no longer ambivalent7 about who it included or what its values
were. It was thus both a vehicle for legal prohibitions and a celebration
of moral rebirth. It served both as law and as a ceremony of
redemption.
Ironically, while Title VII retains its significance as a symbol, it has
little, if any, significance as a means of helping blacks. Title VII created
a context in which it was impossible to speak, in public discourse, of
employment discrimination as a legitimate activity. But reciprocal to
this new concept of discrimination as a public wrong, Title VII inaugu-
rated a concept of discrimination as something extremely difficult to
find. The same statutory regime which ushered in formal equality in the
workplace made discrimination something particularly abstract, mean-
ingless and remote.
For example, in fiscal year 1990 the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission s resolved 67,415 charges.' Of those 67,415 charges, the
Commission determined that discrimination likely occurred in only
2973, or 4% of the cases.10 Of those 2973 cases, the Commission was
the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1595, 1612 (1989).
6. Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and semi-skilled jobs." 110 CONG.
REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Moreover, "the relative position of the negro
worker [was] steadily worsening. In 1947 the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 percent
higher than the white rate; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher." Id. at 6547.
7. More important to the larger society than Title VII's promise to emancipate blacks from
systematic exclusion from skilled jobs was the significance of that promise as an emancipation of
society from a longstanding conflict between the egalitarian values professed and the segregation
practiced in fact. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMk THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (9th ed. 1944).
8. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter the EEOC) is the enforce-
ment agency designated under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. The Commission initially inves-
tigates discrimination complaints, called "charges" of discrimination, and makes a determination
as to whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b). If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred, the
agency has no power to order the employer to cease and desist. Rather it attempts to "conciliat[e]"
the charge. Id. If conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC may bring suit directly in federal court. Id. at
§ 2000e-5(f)(1). The structure of the EEOC administrative process reflects an underlying ambiva-
lence about the nature of discrimination and its place in public life. Discrimination is presump-
tively a private matter best resolved through methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion;
discrimination claims are in tension with the rights of the employer and those rights presumptively
should not be disturbed by cease and desist orders.
9. EEOC Office of Program Operations, Enforcement'Statistics, Fy 1981 - Fy 1990 (1991).
10. Id. Figures here include charges filed under Title VII, the Age Discrimination In Employ-
ment Act, and the Equal Pay Act. The statistical source does not allow for breakdown by statute.
The aggregate figures are probative, however, because discrimination claimants under the various
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able to obtain benefits for the claimants in only 522 cases.-" Thus, only
fourth-fifths of one percent of all claimants obtain any formal relief
through the EEOC administrative process. Although in theory every
claimant who is unsuccessful at the administrative level may seek relief
in court,12 most claimants lack the resources to do so. Further, the over-
whelming majority of those claimants who do pursue Title VII remedies
in court lose.' s
Moreover, the avowed goal' 4 of Title VII, to address the chronic
exclusion of blacks from the mainstream of the American economy, is
more distant than ever before. Overt discrimination has dramatically
decreased, but twenty five years after the passage of Title VII, the eco-
nomic disparity between whites and nonwhites has widened, 15 and ra-
cial stratification has increased.' The specter of racial caste, the evil
which Title VII was conceived to excise, is not only still with us, but
now has a stronger hold on the American soul.'
statutes generally have similar experiences.
11. EEOC, supra note 9.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
13. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner
Cases 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (listing a "success" rate of 22%). Success here may be mis-
leading. The definition of success is: "Who is the 'prevailing party'?" Id. at 1576. The prevailing
party in a Title VII or other civil rights case is the plaintiff if the plaintiff obtains "some of the
relief" sought. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-761 (1987) (stating that a plaintiff might lose on
everything except declaratory judgement-obtaining neither damages nor substantive relief-and
still "prevail"). However, even using this extremely generous definition of "success" "[tihe success
rates for . . . employment discrimination . . . are far below reported trial success rates for most
other litigation." Eisenberg, supra, at 1578.
14. Justice Brennan found that "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII... was with 'the plight of the Negro in our economy'
and that "'[tihe crux of the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occu-
pations which have been traditionally closed to them.'" United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 202-203 (1979) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548, (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (characterizing Title VII as a
statute designed "to achieve equality. . . and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history." (citation omitted)).
15. As of 1984, 4 million of 8.8 million black men between the ages of 16 and 64 were either
unemployed, out of the labor force, or in prison. See Bell, supra note 1, at 11 n.27. See also REYN-
OLDS PARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 217
(1987). (noting that the disparity in unemployment rates between black men aged 16 to 24 and
[their statistical counterparts] increased by almost .5% annually between 1950 and 1985).
16. Blacks as a group are increasingly relegated to a certain socio-economic level. Perhaps
the best evidence of this is the increasing gap between the median income of blacks and the me-
dian income of whites. In 1969 blacks between the ages of 25 and 34 made 68% of that of whites in
the same age group. In 1984 the same group of blacks made only 60% of white income. See FARLEY
& ALLEN, supra note 15, at 305. It is not idle speculation to suggest that increasingly race corre-
lates with class, that the socio-economic predicament of blacks is becoming more and more an
entrenched pattern.
17. Id.
352
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A. The Intent Model: A Problem of Law As Ideology and
Legitimation
It is almost axiomatic of Title VII literature to attribute the gap
between professed ideals and social reality to a tension between the
substantive provisions of Title VII and the evidentiary framework for
proving Title VII claims. Under the common law of Title VII, minori-
ties must validate their discrimination claims against employers by
proving not merely that an employer excluded them from some benefit,
but also that the source of this exclusion was discriminatory intent.'8
Intent is, of course, notoriously difficult to prove.
In the conventional-' critique, the choice of this particular eviden-
18. "The 'factual inquiry' in a Title VH case is '[whether] the defendant intentionally dis-
criminated against the plaintiff'." United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 715 (1983) (citation omitted); accord Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1980); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); see also D. Don Welch,
Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis On Motive Rather
Than Intent, 60 S. CAL,. L. Rav. 733, 734 (1987) (stating that "Itihe need to establish discrimina-
tory intent in order to uphold a Title VII disparate treatment claim is one of the most settled
positions in discrimination theory"). There was a time, of course, when these very conservative
assessments of Title VII proof requirements could be contested. One could have argued under
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and its progeny that there were two models of
proof in Title VII cases. Then, one might have identified an adverse impact model in addition to
an intent model. Under the adverse impact approach only a showing of disproportionate exclusion
would be necessary to establish a prima facie case. However, in the aftermath of Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the two models largely have been collapsed into one.
There is, of course, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 which purports to overrule Wards Cove, but the
Act does move to memorialize a continuing lack of consensus about the vitality and scope of the
adverse impact model than to reverse the doctrinal evisceration of the model. See The Civil Rights
Bill, Pub. L. No. 203-266, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
This emphasis upon intentionality as the arbiter of fault, although commonplace in the com-
mon law of torts, is anomalous in federal regulatory structures. See Thomas G. S. Christensen and
Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Su-
preme Court and Fictive Formality, 77 YALE. L.J. 1269, 1269 (1968) (noting that "[h]orizontal
mergers ... may or may not violate the anti-trust laws, but their illegality is not dependent upon
the motives of their promoters"). Also, it is important to point out that in early labor law cases
involving discrimination, motive "was treated not as an essential element of the substantive viola-
tion, but as an evidentiary aid in determining whether protected union activity had in fact been
the cause of the terminations." Id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
19. By "conventional" I mean the notion that judging is constrained by traditional practices
and conventions. Two key assumptions form the foundation of this interpretive practice. One is
the widely shared view that legislative intent or purpose determines the meaning of statutory text.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation In The Classroom and In The Courtroom,
50 U. CH. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983) (offering an explication of the legislative intent standard); see
also Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 1259, 1259-72 (1947) (offering perhaps the original formulation of the legislative "purpose"
standard). On the difference between the two standards see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-25 (1990).
Another key conventional assumption is the idea that legal reasoning is an "objective" process. See
e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 745 (1982). Conventional-
ist thinking is associated with scientific legalism, in which lawyers must search for neutral princi-
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tiary standard causes the problem. Some scholars argue simply that the
intent standard 20 is not desirable vis-a-vis the broader goal of eradicat-
ing discrimination.2 ' The boldest challenge within this genre is Profes-
sor Fiss's argument that the intent standard is inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute. 22 Title VII prohibits discrimination "be-
cause of",2 3 inter alia, one's race. Relying upon the "because of" lan-
guage, and the conspicuous absence of the word intent, Fiss asserts that
causation is the central inquiry in a discrimination case. In Fiss's view
the intent standard represents a specious "psychological gloss"2 on the
ples to ground interpretive results. The classic work here is HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961). The conventional viewpoint is internal to traditional legal
thought, and traditional legal approaches are seen quite simply as "correct." But see Richard Del-
gado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts On Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1991) (challenging
conventional thinking as ultimately circular).
20. Of course, the concept of intent is notoriously indeterminate: Intent is variously under-
stood as (1) subjective foreseeability (e.g., intentional torts); (2) objective foreseeability (e.g., negli-
gence in tort); and (3) accountability for the consequences of one's behavior (e.g., strict liability).
However, the common law of Title VII entrenches as a standard a narrow notion of intent. In Title
VII doctrine, intent means specific intent to harm just as it would in criminal law. See Alan D.
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1407, 1423 (1990).
21. See Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 588 (1977) (warning that the imposition of onerous intent standards rele-
gates the judiciary to a "severely diminished role in ameliorating racial inequities"); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEO L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1978) (arguing
that the intent standard "places a 'very heavy burden' of persuasion on the wrong side of the
dispute, to the severe detriment of. . . protection of racial equality") (citation omitted); see also
Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII: United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1982) (warning that the intent standard
threatens Title VII goals when courts fail to recognize that burden and order of proof questions
impinge on, and implicitly are in fact, questions of policy).
22. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REV. 235, 297 (1971).
23. Title VII reads in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to. . . discriminate against any individual. . . because of such individual's race. . .; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees. . . in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities. . . because of such individual's race
() It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency ... to discrimi-
nate . . . because of. . . race ....
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to . . . discriminate because of. . . race . ...
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship . . . to discriminate . . . because of
race ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (emphasis added).
24. Fiss, supra note 22, at 297. Fiss points out that gratuitously searching for an intent to
discriminate in "the employer's" mental state ignores much of the victimization experienced by
blacks. Fiss goes on to argue that
[l]ack of adequate information about the productivity of individuals may lead the employer to
make mistakes. He may make incorrect assumptions about the productivity of blacks because
of the general prevalence of racial stereotypes in our society, derived from widespread
354
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causation concept." Thus, the conventionalist approach reflects an im-
pulse to breathe life into Title VII by restoring the "true meaning" of
the discrimination concept. Fiss attempts to determine the true mean-
ing of discrimination through a "fresh" examination of the text itself.
Other conventional authors seek to determine the "true meaning" of
discrimination by divining the statutory purpose or the "social goals"
underlying Title VII.26 The "Conventionalists" rely upon, however, and
are constrained by a search for this meaning within the boundaries of
legislative purpose or intent.
A second school of thought, critical race scholarship, 27 has at-
tempted to challenge the social assumptions which underlie and sur-
round the intentionalist approach. Critical race scholars question the
claim that focus on intent is objective or perspectiveless, pointing out
prejudices and myths generated under the slave regime; or he may make a mistake because of
the lack of social and commercial contacts between races, contacts which are often necessary
to obtain accurate information about applicants for employment.
Id. at 251.
25. In offering a dichotomy between an inquiry into causal nexus and an inquiry into the
employer's actual mental state, Fiss follows a line traced initially by Professor Bickel. See ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH; THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITIcS 209-
10 (2d ed. 1986) (distinguishing between purpose and motive: purpose is the aim, the end to which
a decision leads, while motive is the cause, that from which the decision proceeds). Distinguishing
between motive and intent, D. Don Welch wrote: "Motive addresses the factors that lead into a
decision: the reasons upon which a decision is based. . . Intent is synonymous with purpose. It
speaks to the goals toward which the actor moves, the ends the actor aims to achieve." Welch,
supra note 18, at 736.
26. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 297.
27. Critical race scholarship is a political discourse of people of color within the legal acad-
emy. The point of departure for critical race scholars is an understanding that conventional legal
methods of inquiry often terminate before reaching the context of oppression of blacks and other
people of color. If conventional legal scholars look at law through the epistemological lens of gen-
eral principles, critical race scholars tend to look at law through the lens of their shared exper-
iences. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and
the Hope for Plural Justice, 75 MINN. L. REv. 993 (1991). On the difference between critical race
scholarship and critical legal studies, see Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want? 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987). Bell, supra,
note 1; Frances Ainsley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class, and the Future of Civil Rights Scholar-
ship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993 (1989); Charles Lawrence, The Id., The Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); KimberlI Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Jerome Culp, Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39 (1991); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Col-
orblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Taunya Banks, Aids and Government: Plan of Action: Report
of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immodeficiency Virus Epidemic, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1321 (1989); Harlan Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 435 (1987); Patricia
Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2128 (1989); Mar Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurispru-
dence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
28. As Martha Minow has noted,
Scholars who challenge the implicit, unspoken assumption of objectivity in effect claim that
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that the victims' stories often cannot be heard,29 or their injuries ade-
quately conceptualized 0 within the framework of the "intent model."
One scholar has argued that the intent standard presupposes that dis-
crimination is not the norm, and that there is a class of innocent em-
ployers which has no responsibility for the discrimination problem.3 1 He
characterizes this as the perpetrator perspective. 2 In a similar vein,
Professor Lawrence has challenged the intent model's concept of dis-
crimination as a conscious phenomenon and argues for an approach
that takes the social psychology of racism into account.3 3
B. The Hidden Discursive Barrier
Implicit in the critical racial theory approach is the image of a po-
litical struggle between employers and minorities as a group, occurring
in what is nominally the legal sphere. The intent model serves here as a
means of legitimation: It rationalizes legal standards that privilege the
employers' side of the social debate.34 The unifying theme is the Fou-
caldian impulse 5 to liberate our civil rights discourse by revealing the
knowledge depends on the interaction between the one who sees and what is seen. Reality is
not discovered but constructed and invented-and this process of invention needs itself to be
included within the search for knowledge.
Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal
Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 175 (1987). The
theme that much of what the Supreme Court counts as objective in its conception of equality is in
fact artificial and constructed resonates within the genre. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Obliging
Shell: An Informal Essay On Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2137-43 (1989);
Crenshaw, supra note 27, at 1347-48.
29. See generally Richard Delgado, When Is A Story Just A Story: Does Voice Really Mat-
ter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990) (contrasting a narrative of racial exclusion with the same "story" as it
would be filtered through the intentionalist framework).
30. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 27, at 1344 (arguing that the key difficulty is that the
intentionalist model-denoted here as the "restrictive view" of equality-assumes that "a racially
equitable society already exists").
31. "[Antidiscrimination] law views racial discrimination . . . as the misguided conduct of
particular actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of these misguided ones, the system of
equality of opportunity would work... ." Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REv. 1049, 1054 (1978).
32. Id. at 1054.
33. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
34. See generally Freeman, supra note 31; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419
(1991) (arguing in a related context that formal equality legitimates the subordination of black
women).
35. Foucault's work seems to exhort us to "pose the question of power" to discourse. See
MICHEL FOUcAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). In Foucault's emancipatory
critique, the question posed with respect to the discourse of equality is not so much what does it
mean but who does it serve. Id.
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legal ideology"6 hidden within the doctrine of antidiscrimination law.
There is, however, an invisible discursive barrier, a deep fiction
that stands in the way of locating the "meaning of discrimination" and
of liberating Title VII doctrine from its ideological constraints. It is a
fiction which lurks as an objectivist a7 assumption within both the con-
ventional and the critical critique. It is this fiction which is at the heart
of the intent standard and is the ultimate source of normative tension
within antidiscrimination law. The fiction is the employer himself or
herself. Like the classical trope of an author within a text,"8 the em-
ployer in a Title VII case is a construct.
If the intentionalist model hangs like a fog over the area of antidis-
crimination law, it is a fog the employer has brought in. It is the em-
ployer who demands, in the language of the social contract, that we
carefully determine fault before we intrude into his workplace. It is the
employer who insists that we determine the guilt or innocence of his
mental processes before we can judicially intervene to address the social
problem of discrimination. To the extent we believe in the employer, we
36. The notion of ideology is that it is like a dark glass through which one looks and through
which the world is distorted. See KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 55-75 (1936) (arguing
that people under the sway of an ideology refuse to acknowledge incompatible facts). The notion of
"law's ideology" encompasses the tendency of legal doctrine to obscure or mask the non-neutrality
of legal institutions. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TR&E (1975). In order for ideol-
ogy to work it must be implicit in legal doctrine rather than explicit. Id. As Geertz has pointed out,
"[Ideology] is not (quite) the same as lying. . .' whereas the liar tries to falsify the thought of
others while his own private thought is correct. . . a person who falls for an ideology is himself
deluded in his private thought, and if he misleads others, does so unwillingly and unwittingly."'
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 196, (1973) quoting W. STARK, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF KNOWLEDGE 48 (1958).
37. By "objectivist" I refer to the assumption that there can be a one to one relationship
between words and objects in the world, that legal language acts as a kind of mirror. From this
perspective, "the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. .... Truth
involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external
things." HILARY PUTNAM, REASON. TRUTH AND HISTORY 49 (1981).
38. See, e.g., W. K. WIMSATr, JR. & MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE
MEANING OF POETRY 3 (1954) (arguing that "the design or intention of the author is neither availa-
ble nor desirable as a standard for judging.. .a [literary] work"); see also ROLAND BARTHES, The
Death of the Author, in IMAGE, Music, TEXT 142, 142-48 (S. Heath trans. & ed., 1977) (arguing
that text is the result of the submergence of the author's identity into linguistic and artistic
forms-the author dies in producing a work); STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 46-47
(1980) (arguing that texts are constituted not by authors but by reader's interpretive strategies).
These arguments are, of course, contested. See, e.g., E. D. Hirsch, Counterfactuals In Interpreta-
tion, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LrrzRATURi A HERMENE TiC READER 58 (Sanford Levinson &
Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). However, they represent a position which in many scholarly circles is
orthodoxy itself. It seems that law, and particularly civil rights law, has avoided the critique of
intentionalism by asserting a discontinuity between legal and literary theory. See generally RICH-
ARD POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATUR& A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988). There is the notion that
law is an authoritative text and the judge is constrained in his interpretation by that authority. I
suggest, on the contrary, that law as a text is subject to the same critique, and that this is the same
debate.
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accept the possibility that guilt and innocence really are at stake and
legalisms like fault and intentionality become the false horizons of our
discourse.
The purpose of this paper is to explain how the figure of the em-
ployer appears in and mediates between our civil rights laws and our
social goals. Part II interrogates"9 the claim that the employer is natu-
rally or logically "found" in a discrimination case. That Part questions
the credibility of the notion that discrimination is something the em-
ployer causes or intends and the related fallacy that the "guilty" em-
ployer in a discrimination context can be identified or singled out.40
Part III focuses on the instrumentalism of the employer concept and
shows how the notion of the employer is a metaphor that seeks to unite
a formalistic construct of discrimination with common-law assumptions
about fault. Part IV focuses on the cognitive framework which conceals
the artificiality of the employer concept within both the language of
discrimination law and our interpetive assumptions. Part V concludes
with a call for a debate about how we might conceptualize a new theory
of discrimination law once the employer is removed from our discourse.
II. THE EMPLOYER As MYTH
I notice something and seek a reason for it ... I seek an intention in it, and above
all someone who has intentions, a subject, a doer: every event a deed .....
Our "understanding of an event" has consisted in our inventing a subject which
was made responsible for something that happens and for how it happens. We have
combined our feeling of will, our feeling of "freedom," our feeling of responsibility
39. Interrogation refers to a method of questioning, a digging beneath surface explanation to
search for epistemological foundations. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PoNTY THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISI-
BLE (Claude Lefort ed. & Alphonso Lingis trans., 1968) Ponty's work, inter alia, is an interrogation
of science's claims of knowledge. It is helpful because legal reasoning is often modeled on scientific
reasoning. Although unspoken, antidiscrimination doctrine often presupposes that we know that
"[tihis is the way things are and nobody can do anything about it." Id. at 4. Through the method
of interrogation I endeavor to "make visible" the presence of such claims of certitude within an-
tidiscrimination doctrine and to expose, if not their bias, at least their contingency.
40. Antidiscrimination law has been preoccupied with questions of fault: "Who is guilty of
causing discrimination?" and "Who has acted with wrongful intent?" I suggest there may be a
prior question as to whether the employer plays a role in the discrimination problem in the first
instance. I want to examine the fault question instead of trying to answer it. In the words of
Derrida: "If we answered. . . questions before examining them as questions, before turning them
back on themselves, and before suspecting their very form, including what seems most natural and
necessary about them, we would immediately fall back into what we have just disengaged ourselves
from." JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 14 (Alan Bass trans., 1982). Derrida wrote about
the oppositional relationships between language and speech, text and interpretation, writing and
sign. He warned that within even the most neutral textual propositions lurk a number of hidden
layers of discourse that imperceptibly construct webs of significance in which we may become
trapped. Derrida's insight is supremely applicable to law.
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and our intention to perform an act, into the concept of "cause". .41
A. Every Event A Deed
In viewing the employer as a real person, an active, relevant player
in the discrimination suit, we are like someone who has walked through
a mirror to the other side of the looking glass.4 2 The mirror is the divid-
ing line between fact and value, between reality as it is and our beliefs
and interpretations of reality. It is the dividing line between two differ-
ent rhetorical worlds-one in which discrimination appears as insepara-
ble from historical patterns and one in which discrimination seems to
be inseparable from individual fault.
Perhaps the key cognitive difficulty in grasping the fictional charac-
ter of the employer is that employers are, obviously, real, living individ-
uals with whom we have all had experience. In contrast modern
interpretation has recognized that classical conventions such as the
"framers" of the constitution or the enacting "legislature" are con-
structs for purposes of interpretation.4 ' The framers are not living peo-
ple and we cannot know their intent. To arrive at their intent we must
engage in an imaginative, creative act; we must construct it. Similarly,
although an enacting legislature may be comprised of persons still living
we must nonetheless work with a statute's legislative history, which is
often silent, contradictory or ambiguous. To arrive at the legislative in-
tent of a recent statute, we must engage in a process which Posner calls
"imaginative reconstruction."4 4
Perhaps because of our familiarity with the employer as someone
"we know," his decisions appear to us as "immediate, discrete, and sig-
nificant." Although the employer is firmly rooted in our own experience,
he is only artificially located as the source of the injury we call discrimi-
nation. He is grounded in the doctrine of antidiscrimination law via two
moral and linguistic assumptions: that discrimination involves a wrong-
ful decision (intentionality), and that it involves a discrete actor.
41. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 294, 296 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & R.J. Hol-
lingdale trans., 1967).
42. "This fact is concealed by the influence of language, moulded by science, which foists on
us exact concepts as though they represented the immediate deliverances of experience." FISH,
supra note 38, at 33 (quoting A. N. Whitehead).
43. See e.g., Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framer's Intent, in
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 50 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mail-
loux, eds., 1988). Although arguing for original intention as the arbiter of constitutional meaning,
Fried concedes that we cannot nor should we pretend to be able to "take the top off the heads of
authors and framers-like soft-boiled eggs." See also Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitu-
tional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 457 (1984) (referring to original intent as a legal fiction gener-
ally used to justify the interpreter's own agenda).
44. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985).
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Professor Blumstein perhaps best stated the wrongful decision
premise:
Because the nondiscrimination notion is a procedural concept assuring evenhanded
treatment of similarly situated individuals, it is breached when similarly situated
people are treated differently because of their race. Such differential treatment has
an essential ingredient of volition, and a finding of unconstitutional discrimination
therefore rests on a finding of intent.45
Although Blumstein explicitly attempts only to trace the limits of an-
tidiscrimination law, he implicitly relies upon a widely shared para-
digm 46 of how disparities in treatment of minorities occur. Undergirding
this concept of antidiscrimination law as a matter of "shalt nots" or
mere negative prohibitions is a set of interconnected assumptions which
define and skeletally conceptualize the phenomenon of discrimination.
In Blumstein's iron paradigm, discrimination always originates in
and is coterminous with an employer's decision to treat similarly situ-
ated persons differently. As a corollary to the notion that discrimina-
tion is a problem of decisions, Blumstein posits that such decisions are
both irrational47 and associated with a particular employer's bias or
wrongful state of mind.48 Thus, the source of discrimination lies in the
employer's mental processes. It is the guilt or innocence of those
processes that primarily concerns discrimination law.
This framework of assumptions, supporting the idea of discrimina-
tion as causally linked to an employer's wrongful state of mind, is not
freestanding. In turn, it rests upon a certain underlying schema. 49 Ac-
cording to cognitive theorists, the way we talk about and understand
the world rests on an interior sub-strata of thought of which we are
often unaware ° Thus, our ordinary conceptual and linguistic structures
flow from relatively few prototypical understandings-one of which is
our notion of kinship."1 According to Professor Turner, much of our
45. James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the
Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 643-44 (1983).
46. The word "paradigm" comes from the writings of Thomas Kuhn in the history of science
and refers to an "accepted model or pattern" that provides a framework for "further articulation
and specification under new or more stringent conditions." THOMAS S. KUHN. THE STRUCTURE OF
ScIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 23 (2d ed. 1970).
47. See Blumstein, supra note 45, at 638; see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 650 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that discrimination "on the basis of ... race is, at the very least,
presumptively irrational").
48. Blumstein, supra note 45, at 634-35.
49. "Schema" is a reference to the cognitive models which structure our conceptual frame-
work. See generally Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gov-
ernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
50. See MARK TURNER, DEATH IS THE MOTHER OF BEAUTY: MIND, METAPHOR, CRITIcIsM 7
(1987); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE By 19-21 (1980) (providing a sur-
vey of the relevant research).
51. TURNER, supra note 50, at 22-51. The starting point for seeing how kinship notions are
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conceptual apparatus is concerned with how "things in the world, the
mind, and behavior can spring from each other. ' 52 It follows that the
concept of causation emerges from our concept of progeneration. In cog-
nitive terms, that which causes something is the parent, while that
which it causes is the offspring.53 The intentionalist model of discrimi-
nation deploys precisely this cognitive framework. The rhetoric54 of
conventional doctrine portrays discrimination as a thing which springs
fullblown from the mind-or the wrongful state of mind-of the em-
ployer.55 This image results even when the context suggests that the
problem lies within historical or traditional patterns of segregation.
Thus, although a seniority system may lock in the results of past exclu-
sion, it is not discriminatory in the doctrinal account unless it "ha[s] its
genesis" in racial animus.5 s Both liberals and conservatives5 7 talk this
able to facilitate the organization of our conceptual universe is the idea that cognitively we start
with three categories-world, mind and behavior. Id. at 40-53.
52. Id. at 40.
53. As Turner explains, "WHAT SPRINGS FROM SOMETHING IS ITS OFF-
SPRING .... The arrow springs from the bow. Therefore, Job 41:20 calls the arrow the son of the
bow .... Since effects spring from their causes, CAUSES ARE PARENTS AND EFFECTS ARE
OFFSPRING. For example, age is the mother of sickness." Id. at 24.
54. "Rhetoric" has two senses. In an Aristotelean sense, rhetoric refers to a realm of dis-
course in which, in contrast to the realm of science, exact certainty is possible. See PAUL RIcOEUR,
THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE
9-43 (Robert Czerny et al. trans., 1977). In this sense rhetoric represents the marriage of reason
with the impulse to persuade. Id. at 9. Rhetoric also refers, however, to the "power to manipulate
words" and to "manipulate men by manipulating words." Id. at 11. It is this latter sense in which I
use the word. More specifically, by rhetorical strategy I refer to what Dworkin calls a "semantical"
theory. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 33-44 (1986). In the debate about the foundations of
law, Dworkin notes that some thinkers presuppose that lawyers all agree on the grounds of law or
about the criteria for determining what law is. The presuppositions are entrenched in discourse via
a set of linguistic rules which classify propositions as law or not law based on unexamined assump-
tions about the limits of the concept. There is a similar problem in the discourse of equality. Not
only do courts presuppose that discrimination is analogous to an intentional act, but they also
accept this unexamined assumption perpetuated by a linguistic convention imposed as "law."
55. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (Marshall J.,
dissenting).
56. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356 (1977) (identify-
ing the issue as whether "the seniority system .. ha[d] its genesis in [intentional] racial discrimi-
nation, and whether "it was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose");
accord Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989); Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273 (1982). To be sure, the Court frames the threshold question as one of legislative
intent, more specifically, whether Congress under § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1981), intended that seniority systems remain immune from claims that they perpetuate past
exclusions. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 345-46. However, I suggest that the underlying, deeper conflict
is simply over how we conceptualize discrimination. The concept which drives Teamsters and the
subsequent opinions is discrimination as something that has its genesis in the employer's wrongful
mental state.
57. I use the terms "liberal" and "conservative" in their ordinary meaning in American polit-
ical discourse. Liberals and conservatives by definition often differ on political and social issues.
However, both liberals and conservatives often and perhaps typically share traditional, conven-
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way. For example, Justice Marshall, in Public Employees Retirement
System v. Betts,5s although suggesting the burden of proof should be
placed on the employer, spoke of discrimination as something "born of
improper intent" in the mind of the employer. 9 In the conventional
account the employer is quite simply the mother of discrimination. The
rhetoric of the employer engendering discrimination-the core word-
picture within Blumstein's paradigm that the employer "causes" dis-
crimination-resonates from and is reinforced by our kinship based
cognitive understandings. This harmonic confluence of legal rhetoric
and cognitive structure drowns out the genuine dissonance between
Blumstein's mechanical paradigm of discrimination and discrimination
as it is experienced. The notion that the employer engenders discrimi-
nation comes to sound quite natural.
Thus, the doctrinal concept of the employer as the origin of dis-
crimination generally finds acceptance as not an opinion of how dis-
crimination occurs, but as an objective"° and self-evident description of
it. The employer, however, does not "objectively" exist as the source of
discrimination in the social world or as a proper center of concern in
discrimination law. Objectively, an employer's wrongful decisionmaking
does not "engender" or "cause" discrimination. The employer who
"causes" discrimination because of his wrongful state of mind is simply
an imaginary composite figure, a corollary of simplistic fallacies about
intent and causality embedded in the language of antidiscrimination
law. The rhetorical imagery of discrimination springing fullblown from
the wrongful state of mind of the employer is merely a fictional individ-
ualization of what is, in fact, a collective responsibility.
Lawyers tend to conceptualize a cause as the "necessary antece-
dent" to an outcome."' The employer's wrongful decision is simply not a
tional assumptions about the "correct" meaning of legal concepts and "correct" methods of legal
interpretation. Cf. David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986) (using the adjec-
tive "liberal" so broadly that it embraces both politics and methodology: "Liberalism refers to
contemporary legal theory and the artificial conventions [i.e., the methods] of that theory").
58. 492 U.S. 158, 182 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Justice Marshall argues that "a more appropriate approach would place the burden on
the employer to show that the discrimination was not born of improper intent." Betts, 492 U.S. at
186 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. By "objective" I mean that Blumstein specifically, and conventional scholars in general,
assume that there is no space, nothing mediating between the idea of discrimination as something
an employer causes and our actual experience. This idea, however, is nothing more than an inter-
pretation of human experience that incredibly is not apparent as such to the interpreter. "This
simply means . . . that the context is so established, so deeply assumed, that it is invisible to the
observer." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 315, 320-21 (1989); see also Steven L. Winter, Bull Dur-
ham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639, 643 (1990).
61. This is what Professor Prosser has called the "necessary antecedent" rule or the "but
for" rule. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266 (5th
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cause in this sense. In post-Coasean" normative terms, causation is an
instrumental fiction used to isolate conduct identified as a social evil.
Even in this normative sense, the idea of the employer as the locus of
discriminatory animus seems strained. The individual employer's state
of mind, his malice or irrationality, is not the source of the injured vic-
tim's discrimination experience. Society, not the employer, is the
mother of discrimination.
For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins," a female manager
named Ann Hopkins sought promotion to partner in a major accounting
firm.6 4 Ms. Hopkins, like a female version of Horatio Alger, "worked
long hours, [and] pushed vigorously to meet deadlines .. ."65 One of
her clients "described her as 'extremely competent, intelligent,' 'strong
and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative'." 66 The accuracy
of this assessment was evinced by her success in obtaining a twenty-five
million dollar contract for the firm with the Department of State.6 7 No
other partnership candidate could equal her record .of productivity. 8
She was, however, denied promotion. 9
On the surface, the reasons for Hopkins' denial-poor interper-
sonal skills and an offensive manner-were neutral.70 The fact that
Hopkins did not fit some of her co-workers' ideas of womanhood, how-
ever, clearly contributed to this negative evaluation of her performance.
One partner characterized her as "macho".7 1 Another suggested that
ed. 1984). The "but for" rule actually explains the majority of instances confronted in law. There
is, of course, an exception in situations where an event may be the product of two concurrent
causes. Id. But for our purposes, in the context of interrogating Blumstein's paradigm in which he
has posited an inextricable nexus between employer and discrimination, the "but for" rule is per-
fectly appropriate.
62. Coase asks whether traditional notions of causation are really grounded in "objectivity."
His discussion reveals that the traditional "neutral" analysis of causation is actually traceable to
normative assumptions rather than empirically verifiable data. Empirically, cattle cause the graz-
ing of a neighboring farmer's land no more than does the neighboring farmer who chooses to reside
within grazing range of the cattle. Coase collapses the nominally empirical question of causation
into the question of policy. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-13
(1960); see also Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgements In Liberal
Political Theory 2 (Dec. 1986) (working paper, on file with the University of Miami Law Library)
(arguing that since parties must interact to cause harm "we can never fully causally attribute
damage to any [defendant], and there is no obvious way to distinguish, on purely causal grounds,
the relative contributions of two wholly necessary parties.").
63. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 231-32.
65. Id. at 234.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 233-34.
68. Id. at 234.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 234-35.
71. Id. at 235.
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she take "a course in charm school. '7 2 One partner, whose job it was to
help Ms. Hopkins understand her areas of weakness, advised Ms. Hop-
kins to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry. 7 3 These
comments, many of which were made in writing, went forward through
two levels of administrative review, including an Admission's Commit-
tee and a Policy Board.74
The Price Waterhouse case vividly illustrates both the pervasive-
ness of stereotyping 75 in the workplace and how those stereotypes are
often shared not only by those who set out to denigrate minorities, but
also those who do not. These stereotypes created distinct barriers to
Ms. Hopkins' aspirations for promotion. However, to fit within the con-
ventional paradigm of discrimination law, the problem of stereotyping
must be tied to a discrete wrongful decision." The threshold difficulty
flows from the nature of stereotyping: it is an unconscious mental pro-
cess.7 7 The stereotyping is irrational, it is wrongful, but it is not an ac-
tive decision or deliberate act. In a real sense, it is more cultural artifact
than individual choice.
Moreover, the multi-level nature of the selection process placed a
layer of bureaucracy between the recommenders who engaged in open
stereotyping and the final decisionmakers on the policy board. This al-
lowed Price Waterhouse to argue credibly that the governing board re-
jected Ms. Hopkins as a practical matter because she did not seem to fit
in.7 Justice Brennan, for the plurality, found the employer liable but
only through the agency of its own rhetorical strategy: the Court pos-
ited that by taking into account comments of partners who were biased,
the employer inevitably considered sex. On the contrary, it is difficult
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 232-33.
75. Stereotyping is what cognitivists refer to as a process of "categorization." Lawrence,
supra note 33, at 337. Lawrence explains the rationale for categorization through interest theory.
Categorization of women as having certain attributes-inability to be managers for example-is
consistent with preserving traditional male advantage. Similarly, categorizing blacks as inferior is
consistent with preserving traditional racial hierarchies: "[T]he preservation of inaccurate judge-
ments about the out-group is self-rewarding." Id.
76. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243-44.
77. See Lawrence, supra note 33, at 338-39. Lawrence argues that:
[a]ll of these processes ...occur outside the actor's consciousness. ... Case studies have
demonstrated that an individual who holds stereotyped beliefs about a "target" will remem-
ber and interpret past events ... in ways that bolster and support his stereotyped be-
liefs. . . .The decisionmaker who is unaware of the selective perception that has produced
her stereotype will not view it as a stereotype.
78. She was characterized as "universally disliked." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. The
Supreme Court attempts to identify the case as a mixed motive case.
79. Id. at 251.
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to imagine a practical employer who would force an unpopular em-
ployee on a firm regardless of sex. The employer's action is not neutral,
but it is, it seems, at least unthinking. It reflects not deliberate action,
but rather an institutional indifference to an existing corporate culture
which is structured as a microcosm of a larger culture of sexist presup-
positions about the role of women.
The claim that the policy board's discriminatory animus caused
Ms. Hopkins to be rejected is both artificial and abstract in this con-
text. The exclusion minorities experience as discrimination does not
necessarily hinge on the employer's wrongful mindset. Nor are the deci-
sions of the employer inevitably the source of race or sex based con-
straints placed on minority aspirations. The formal decisionmaking
process in this case, and perhaps generally, simply constitutes a micro-
cosm of far more complex structures of marginalization.
Similarly, it was simply not the malice or irrationality of the em-
ployer which precipitated the discrimination against Ms. Hopkins. In a
narrow sense the employer as the Policy Board acted rationally and
without malice. The pain and stigma 0 of Ms. Hopkins' rejection oc-
curred because of the traditional and pervasive view that minorities like
Hopkins are somehow undesirable. The stigma flowed not from the iso-
lated fact of the denial, but from the specific denials' relation to a pat-
tern of denials which resonate and reverberate throughout American
society, all tending to declare particular minorities as inferior or limited
to a certain place. The stigma flowed from the fact that each denial of
opportunity, in the context of the larger pattern, carries with it an in-
crement of prediction that future denials lie ahead.
To place this argument back in the specific context of race, it is
possible to humiliate a black by calling him or her a "nig-r.'s Indeed,
the image of someone being called a "nig-r" is perhaps the paradigm of
80. The notion of stigma-which literally refers to marking by blood-may be traced back to
the biblical narrative recounting how the Jews were set apart in the land of Egypt: "And they shall
take some of the blood and put it on the two door posts and the lentil of the houses. . ." Exodus
12:7-14. Stigma, as a term referring to a label or mark of inferiority, entered the American legal
lexicon as a term to encapsulate white attitudes about blacks. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 406, 409 (1856) (speaking of stigma as something that set the "negro African" apart, and as
attaching the "deepest degradation" upon the entire black race).
81. I follow Matsuda's practice of not spelling out racial epithets. Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2329 n.49
(1989); see also AUDRE LORDE, To the Poet Who Happens to be Black and the Black Poet Who
Happens to be a Woman, in OuR DEAD BEHIND Us 6, 7 (1986). Lorde wrote:
but I remember a promise
I made my pen
never to leave it
lying
in somebody else's blood.
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our concept of a racial slur. In our historical context, the notion of
blacks as "nig-rs" rationalized their segregation on trains, in schools, in
housing, in medical care, and in jobs. It conjures up a stereotype of
someone lazy, ignorant, unintelligent and, of course, black. The vio-
lence82 of calling someone a "nig-r"aS is not merely the refusal to accept
someone's humanity, it is the prophecy that, as a black, one will never
be accepted. It designates one's color as an unbridgeable divide, an irre-
ducible wall. The epithet becomes a disempowering evocation of a dif-
fuse racial mindset which will everywhere bar access to one's dreams."s
The evocation depends entirely on social and historical context for its
meaning.
The wrongfulness of a particular employer decision has no mean-
ing, no significance as discrimination in itself. Rather, history and the
social milieu in which we are situated create the significance of a biased
decision. As such, discrimination cannot be reduced to an isolated se-
quence of a wrongful state of mind leading to an inequitable decision.
As the Price Waterhouse case shows, genuine disparities may occur
without an employer's wrongful state of mind. More importantly, a sin-
gle employer with a wrongful state of mind cannot cause the stigma of
discrimination because discrimination can only be constituted by social
practice and requires a social or historical dimension to exist.
B. The Speaker In the Text
Moreover, even if discrimination could be identified as something
which springs from an employer's wrongful state of mind, the problem
,of identifying the individual responsible, of separating the innocent
from the guilty or the good from the bad, would remain. This determi-
82. See Matsuda, supra note 81 (arguing that, seen in context, there is a moral equivalence
between racial epithets and violence); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 452 (speaking of the "injurious im-
pact" of racist speech).
83. Stigma, in the black experience, represents a notion of having one's humanity imprisoned
within a set of unalterable, absolutely degrading racial attitudes. It is the perceived omnipresence
or inescapability of the attitudes which creates a felt wall between blacks and a sense of per-
sonhood: "[T]o be a negro meant, precisely, that one was never looked at but was simply at the
mercy of the reflexes the color of one's skin caused in other people." JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A
NATIvE SON 93 (1955). And, there is something which all black men [hold] in common, something
which cut[s] across opposing points of view, and placefs] in the same context their widely dissimi-
lar experience .... What, in sum, black men [hold] in common [is] their ache to come into the
world as men." JAMES BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME: MORE NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 29
(1961).
84. Thus, we cannot get rid of discrimination even if we could get rid of all employers who
make formal decisions premised on racial animus. Discrimination is always and already within the
marketplace, and it is often informal, hidden within shared stereotyping assumptions that act
merely as a lens (imperceptible to'the employer himself) through which minorities, in their full
humanity, become invisible.
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nation requires the conceit that discrimination is traceable to a discrete
individual actor and a discrete individual act.
Discrimination is not a discrete event. It is a reservoir or lake 5 in
which a myriad of social institutions from slavery to Jim Crow, from
literature to science, from religious practices to housing patterns, from
disparate education to disparate health care have all deposited their
streams. It is a reservoir not merely of individual hatreds and fears, but
also of institutional inertia and cultural bias built upon a myriad of
myths and stereotypes. Given this reservoir of disparities, there is no
need for affirmative individual acts to occur.
The essence of effective racial discrimination was and remains the creation of rules
and circumstances that minimize the necessity for new acts of intentional discrimi-
nation. Once such a system has been established, all that is accomplished by for-
bidding further intentional discrimination is interference with the ability of biased
officials to fine-tune the system and adapt it to unforeseen developments. 6
The focus on individual employers represents a denial8 7 of the ex-
tent to which the past conditions our racial present. It is a refusal to
read discrimination fact patterns as part of the larger historical narra-
tive," and a choice to read them instead as local drama or local narra-
85. The image is borrowed from Taine. See Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine, Introduction to the
History of English Literature, in CRITIcIsM: THE MAJOR TEXTS 505 (W. J. Bate, ed., 1970) (stating
that "race is no simple spring but a kind of lake, a deep reservoir wherein other springs have, for a
multitude of centuries, discharged their several streams"). Taine argues that race is the source, in
literature, of all structures of thoughts and feeling. Id. Ironically, precisely this ideology about race
(which Taine expresses in exemplary fashion), having been artificially made so central to discourse,
becomes the reservoir of all structure of feeling and thought. See Henry Louis Gates, Race, Writ-
ing, and Difference, 4 Miss. C. L. REv. 287 (1984) (arguing that race, for all its power over the
imagination, is a fiction).
86. Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 863 (1983).
87. In the particular context of employment I articulate a critique stated in general terms by
Professor Peller:
It is necessary to resist the image of social relations as simple products of individual intent
and choice. Rather, we must recognize and articulate the social and external aspects inherent
in so-called private relations. . . . "Private" relations are "private" to the extent that they
are represented as not constituted or influenced by "absent" public or social forces .... The
metaphysic of [the independent subject] denies the politics of the social construction of the
self and the other....
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1178 (1985).
88. That which gives both our legal and political community its cohesiveness and unity is an
underlying epic story or narrative. As Professor Cover eloquently wrote:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and
give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once
understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 4-5 (1983). There is the historical story of how blacks were subjected to Jim chattel slavery
and Jim Crow. However, the narrative or story that structures antidiscrimination law is that the
bad old days are gone and the nation has renounced this history. As part of this story the litigation
by blacks recounting individual episodes of exclusion and victimization signifies nothing more than
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tive about discrete persons interacting with one another with discrete
legal consequences. Within the ahistorical concept of discrimination as
a local narrative-or morality play-it seems natural to focus on indi-
vidual actors-the plot does not make sense without them."9
Similarly, if the discrimination case is a narrative or story it must
have an author, someone whose thoughts, desires and intentions give
meaning and significance to the actions which take place.90 The em-
ployer's intent creates the dimensions in which legal frameworks of
fault and formal equality can operate. The actual mental event of the
employer deciding to hire or fire the minority creates a past and a pre-
sent and opens up a moral dimension-was the decision to hire or fire
innocent or guilty?
This formalist91 concept that a discrete person exists who, like the
an effort to rehash history. Black claimants seek in the "stories" they tell to show how their exper-
iences as victims are reenactments of the bad old days, how the present injury is shot through with
the archetypal injuries of their community. They seek to use their history and group experiences as
a mirror which reflects their personal situations. The employer, however, perpetually objects to the
relevance of the historical narrative that blacks would like to use. He insists that we hear only the
story of this particular case.
89. Addressing the contemporary novel, the French philosopher Roland Barthes wrote:
On the one hand, the characters (whatever one calls them-dramatis personae or actants)
form a necessary plane of description, outside of which the slightest reported 'actions' cease to
be intelligible; so that it can be said that there is not a single narrative in the world without
"characters."
BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in IMAGE, Music, TEXT, at 79, 105
(1977). Barthes, argues, however, that characters or specific agents are not necessary for action to
occur. Rather, discourse often drives actions in literature. Id. at 106.
90. Of course, in the classical conception the author created the meaning: "the explanation
of a work is always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end
• . . the voice of a single person, the author confiding in us." BARTHES, supra note 38, at 143. The
author thus speaks to us within the text. Modern criticism has viewed this as a "romantic" fiction.
See WIMSATr & BEARDSLEY, supra note 38, at 6); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 35. According to
Foucault, text in the modern view is a product of cultural conventions as opposed to the author's
personal expression: "Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he
writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular individuality. . . . IT]he mark of
the writer is reduced to nothing more than the singularity of his absence .... [I]t is language
which speaks, not the author." Id. at 102-03. In the current approach to discrimination we seem to
believe that there is a single person who acts or "speaks" within the narrative of a discrimination
case. We think that a single employer, through his bias or lack of it, determines the meaning or
moral significance of the employment action. But discrimination is, like writing, a cultural phe-
nomenon. Antidiscrimination law has yet to appreciate the extent to which the employer, like the
.author, is culturally and historically situated. This area of law is not yet modern.
91. Formalism generally refers to a theory of interpretation in which a text has a single cor-
rect meaning that exists prior to the act of interpretation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes In The Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 407, 416 (1989) (describing formalism by
using the term textualism, and setting forth arguments in favor of textualism). Under formalism,
the text constrains the interpreter so that he has no choice, i.e., there is an objectively correct
interpretation. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 515 (1988). The spin I give to
formalism is the notion-specious I think-that in legal interpretation there is no freedom to go
outside the formal doctrine to consider social context and shared experience. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE
IMAGE, TEXT, AND TITLE VII
author of a text, creates the discrimination case (and the corollary that
the act of discrimination occurs between identifiable individual actors)
in the real world dissolves in the reservoir of race. This dissolution is
illustrated by the recurrence of virtually identical patterns of exclusion
of blacks from the higher echelons of nearly every industry and profes-
sional field in our society.92 The recurrence of these patterns of exclu-
sion suggests a common source. It contradicts the atomistic concept of
the marketplace as composed of discrete individual employers making
discrete decisions. Discrimination involves not merely autonomous psy-
chological processes but, more importantly, shared, recurring expecta-
tions, which themselves are impregnated with racial assumptions.
Discrimination recurs because individual employers merely replicate
the cultural assumptions they internalize. Because the process is uncon-
scious, it does not require a dimension of conscious choice or fault as
such. Racial stereotypes drawn from culture destroy not only the indi-
viduality of blacks but also the individuality of the employer. In a real
sense racial stereotypes are a kind of text. As the author dies in the
creative process of constructing a text,93 the employer, as a rational au-
tonomous individual, dies in the creative process of constructing in his
own mind the text of a racial stereotype.
Moreover, the stereotypes and cultural assumptions rarely surface
as discrete and intentional discriminatory acts, rather they emerge as
part of a complex and crystalline reticulation of policies and practices
such as old-boy networks or rigid qualifications which disproportion-
ately exclude minorities. The disproportionate exclusion propagates the
stereotype; the existence of the stereotype legitimates the exclusion.
The individual decisionmaking process blurs and dissolves within the
cultural and historical dynamism of the process. The reservoir of dis-
crimination that results from all this has grown quite deep. Thus,
CONCEPT OF LAW 124-30 (1961) (defining formalism as a refusal to acknowledge the necessity of
choice in the penumbral area of rules); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism In Recent Constitu-
tional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1502, 1506-07 (1985) (criticizing formalism as the artificial narrow-
ing of the range of choices).
92. Although blacks comprise 12.3% of the population, they comprise only 2.3% of the law-
yers and judges, 3.3% of the doctors, 3.8% of the engineers, 4.4% of the architects, and 6.1% of
the managers and administrators. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No.
645, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 389 (1990). Moreover, the relatively small num-
bers of blacks who make it into the elite professions tend to earn less than their white counter-
parts. For example the median earnings for blacks in professional jobs is only 75% of the median
earnings for whites. FARLEY & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 272 table 9.2. Similarly, the median earn-
ings for blacks in executive, managerial, and administrative jobs is only 78% of the median earn-
ings of their white counterparts. Id.
93. Foucault wrote that "[t]he work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, now
possesses the right to kill, to be its author's murderer. . . the writer . . . must assume the role of
the dead man in the game of writing." FOUCAULT, supra note 35, at 103.
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neither a discrete individual employer nor a discrete individual em-
ployer's intent awaits discovery within the discrimination case. To the
extent we find a discrete individual employer in these cases it is an em-
ployer conveniently constructed to serve the purposes of formalism.
The case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio94 illustrates the
point. In Wards Cove, Aleuts and Filipinos challenged the de facto ra-
cial stratification in a cannery plant: whites worked in the administra-
tive office and in other skilled positions while nonwhites were relegated
to the cannery floor with inferior pay, working conditions, food, and
shelter.9 5 The exclusion of nonwhites from the higher echelons of the
work force was so extreme that one justice analogized it to plantation
life.98
Although there were no express policies preventing minorities from
seeking noncannery jobs, a system of interlocking discretionary em-
ployer practices locked the racial stratification into place. Nonwhite
cannery employees had problems applying for jobs outside of the can-
nery. For example, if they applied during the season in which they were
working, they were not considered because the employer only accepted
applications off season. Moreover, the vast majority of the minority
cannery workers had been hired locally and were from Alaska. 8 On the
other hand, the employer recruited for noncannery jobs mainly in
Washington or Oregon.9 Further, there were no posted job vacancies,
and no listed job qualifications.100 Nonwhites neither knew when jobs
were vacant nor what "qualifications" were needed for the job. More-
over, while the employer claimed that certain noncannery jobs were
skilled, in many instances, this was a subjective label. The jobs often
required skills that could be provided in brief training,101 yet the em-
player provided no training to cannery employees.102 Finally, there was
no formal promotion system. Recruitment for noncannery jobs was by
word of mouth from incumbent, predominantly white noncannery
workers to their friends and relatives who almost always were also
white.103 Under this system the overwhelmingly white noncannery work
94. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
95. Id. at 647.
96. Justice Stevens wrote that "[s]ome characteristics of the Alaska salmon industry de-
scribed in this litigation-in particular, the segregation of housing and dining facilities and the
stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic lines-bear an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a
plantation economy"). Id. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 674.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 677 n. 26.
102. See id. at 675.
103. Id. at 678 n.28.
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force consistently perpetuated itself.
The difficulty for the nonwhites in this case was that the fact pat-
tern did not fit within the common-law baselines 04 imposed by the
Court on discrimination claims. The Court required the minorities to
show a causal nexus between their exclusion from higher paying jobs
and a specific set of employer decisions made. The minorities had to
show that their deprivation was caused by something identifiable and
concrete, such as the employer's failure to post job vacancies, or the
employer's use of an informal promotion procedure. They simply could
not meet this burden. The sheer informality of the practices (very little
documentation of reasons for decision was available) together with a
veritable kaleidoscope of interlocking obstacles militated against a
showing of which specific decision caused the problem. The web of in-
formality, the unwritten standards, the word of mouth referrals within
a network of insiders, all of which ensnared the minorities in Wards
Cove, were not the products of a specific person or a discrete set of
decisions. Rather, they resulted from a complex intersection of racial
stereotypes, institutional inertia, and the systematic, historic disparities
in job skills between the minorities who were locked into lower paying
jobs and the whites who were not. That same intersection between cul-
tural stereotypes, historical disparities in job skills, and unwritten stan-
dards which adversely impact on minorities is typically present-to one
degree or another-throughout the employment setting.
For the Supreme Court, the minorities' argument was simply inco-
herent. Indeed, the Court's requirement that the specific injurious deci-
sions be identified'0 5 was no more than the Court's specification of the
elements of a coherent claim. Because the minorities could not identify
the specific decisions which had harmed them they could not make out
a claim that was coherent for the court. From the Court's perspective,
without evidence of a causal nexus between an identifiable employer
decision and injury, no violation of law could conceivably be
established.
This is, of course, circular. The Court begins with the objectivist
104. The notion of baseline refers to the idea that legal doctrine inevitably involves fore-
ground/background relationships. Legal concepts which appear in the doctrinal foreground depend
on background assumptions for perspective and evaluation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Leg-
acy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1987) (speaking of common-law assumptions-the back-
ground-as the unarticulated baseline against which departures are measured and determined to
be constitutional violations). The concept of baseline is traced to Robert Hale's work. Robert L.
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCL Q. 470, 472-77
(1923) (arguing that a background distribution of entitlements determines our perception of what
constitutes coercion by the state).
105. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
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assumption that discrimination means'016 that a particular employer de-
cided to treat similarly situated people differently because of race. It
follows within this line of reasoning that when that employer is not
identified the Court concludes that there is no discrimination.
If one starts from the opposite conceptual baseline-the a priori
moral assumption that segregation and subordination of minorities, de
facto or otherwise, is an unacceptable result-Wards Cove becomes a
paradigm not of an incoherent claim, but of the incoherence of formal
models of proof. The Wards Cove paradigm demonstrates that there
are many outcomes which are horribly unfair and unacceptable in moral
terms because they allow the disparate treatment of minorities but
which are not directly traceable to a particular actor or intent. Both the
discrete employer and his "intent to discriminate" are simply
unavailable.
The individual employer and his mental state, like the classical no-
tion of the author of a work, began as and remain instrumental fictions.
These devices allow courts to close the text and require plaintiffs to
explain stories about discrimination within a closed framework of class-
ical moral assumptions. 07 When the Court uncovers the wrongful mo-
tive and identifies the discriminating employer, the story is explained.
In this case, the Court has discovered a willful violation of the law and,
within the framework of the fault model, has the moral authority to
take corrective action. 08 When the Court cannot find the discriminat-
ing employer the story changes-the plaintiff is not injured-and the
story is also explained. The plaintiff may have been treated unfairly but
this is not a legal claim. These mechanical explanations assume that all
plaintiffs' claims are part of a larger, never-ending story, a legitimating
myth about discrimination as a problem of individual mind set, justice
106. My approach identifies the rhetorical structure of the decision. That is, the explicit ra-
tionale of the Wards Cove case flows from what the court assumes about the nature of language
and meaning. From the court's "objectivist" perspective, words naturally have fixed meanings.
This view leads to a rhetorical practice in which the word "discrimination" is always used as if a
single, objectively correct definition applied. See D. Marvin Jones, Unrightable Wrongs: The
Rehnquist Court, Civil Rights, and an Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 36 (1990). That
definition posits that discrimination always refers to a decision to treat similarly situated individu-
als differently. Having so fixed the parameters of the discrimination concept, the discrimination
inquiry becomes the juridical equivalent of a Procrustean bed. Those experiences which don't fit
must be stretched, distorted, or cut off altogether.
107. See BARTHES, supra note 38, at 147 (warning that this closure effect-is the raison d'atre
of the author's existence).
108. See Paul Gewirtz, Choice In the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 734 (1986) (stating that a finding of liability "unleashes a transi-
tional regime during which courts temporarily adopt remedial rules that would be inappropriate if
discrimination had not occurred and that will become inappropriate once the effects of discrimina-
tion have been eliminated").
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as procedural fairness and equality as formal equality only. The Court
has heard the plaintiff (provided procedural fairness). The Court has
celebrated our commitment to equality (albeit a formal version of it),
and the Court implicitly has affirmed the idea that racial unfairness is
not the norm, not a routine product of the decisions employers make,
but something resulting from the particular individual's bad intent.
The figure of the individual employer, which began as a myth, must
end as such within the illuminating fact pattern of Wards Cove. The
complexities of societal discrimination and historical inequalities are
not disentangled, nor are they capable of being disentangled by search-
ing for an identifiable decisionmaker at which to point a finger.109 The
individual employer, seemingly so clearly in place in the text of a dis-
crimination case, blurs and disappears into institutional inertia, into a
cultural ethos of racial stereotypes, into the historical reservoir of race.
III. THE EMPLOYER As METAPHOR
It is not enough to know that the employer is an imaginary figure;
it is essential to know why we have imagined him.
The fiction of the employer can only be understood in terms of a
battle over the boundaries of discrimination. The employer is quite sim-
ply a rhetorical device by which one Side of the conflict seeks to locate
the discrimination within the confines of a grand theory about individ-
ual rights. 110 This battle over the conceptual boundary of discrimina-
tion is equally a battle over the legitimacy of a certain ordering of the
social world. The stakes are not only whether or not the oppression of
minorities can be coherently conceptualized but also whether or not the
classical legal world view, in which equality claims have been confined,
will persist. This section will sketch the outlines of the theoretical de-
bate and then demonstrate how the fiction of the employer privileges
one side of the debate and suppresses the other.
Discrimination is a concept located at the intersection between
moral philosophy and law. It is a normative description of events"'
109. Professor Patricia Williams eloquently made the point that discrimination law, in its
preoccupation with identifying specific violators, amounts to an ongoing effort to place blame on
individuals. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMi L. R.v. 127 (1987).
110. The difficulty with this grand theory, which reposes at the core of cases like Wards
Cove, and which empowers the employer, is that it denies the experience of minorities; it denies
that anything which cannot be traced to the individual employer's will falls within the category of
discrimination.
111. Geertz calls this thick description. The idea is that we assume a one to one relationship
between interpretation of phenomena and phenomena that exist within our cultural ethos. GEERTZ,
supra note 36, at 3-30. As the workman's tool becomes part of his arm, so do the mechanisms of
interpretation and the underlying value assumptions which ground our interpretations. See WIL-
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rather than an observation of an empirical fact; discrimination is to
what happens in the workplace as obscenity is to what happens on a
stage.
Two great diverging concepts of discrimination compete to deter-
mine the content of our civil rights discourse."' One concept is liberal,
one conservative, one pragmatic, one rigidly contractarian. One is
rooted in the gritty realism of social context, one in formal legal princi-
ples. One has as its goal "real equality," one only "formal equality."
The fault line that separates the two concepts of discrimination tracks
the dichotomy between the historical and social experience of blacks
and the world of legal forms.
A. Real Equality: The Historical Group Model of Discrimination
From the baseline of the historical experience of blacks, discrimina-
tion appears as a monolithic pattern of systematic exclusion.113 Blacks
are excluded as a group, on the basis of their race from every endeavor
germane to life. Moreover, from the standpoint of blacks, the signifi-
cance of racial distinctions as racism flows not from the individual in-
stance of a denial of a job, but from the significance of the denial within
a social context which connotes inferiority and stigma. From this histor-
ical and experiential vantage point, racial unfairness results from the
existing pattern of racial exclusion which is coextensive with the spe-
cific exclusion." 4 Blacks speak of individual discrimination, but, as has
LIAM S. HAMRICK, AN EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF LAW: MAURICE MERLEAU PONTY 138 (1987).
We cease to be aware of the operation of these background assumptions.
112. See generally Fiss, supra note 22, at 237-49 (presenting the seminal insight that two
competing moral norms exist within the concept of equality). I identify the dichotomy as that
between "real equality" and "formal equality," while Fiss distinguishes between "equal treatment"
and "equal achievement." Cf. Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis
of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531, 540 n.33 (1981) (distinguish-
ing between "freedom now" and "status quo" approaches); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976)
(distinguishing between discrimination as a "process" and as a "result"); Gewirtz, supra note 108,
at 729 (differentiating between "purposeful discrimination" and "disadvantage").
113. Through an historical lens the problem of racism toward blacks appears primarily as an
institution, something grounded in the very structure of society. See JOHN BLASSINGOAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITY (1979) (examining slavery as a culture); EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL:
THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974) (portraying antebellum Southern plantation life); J. SAUN-
DERS REDDING, THEY CAME IN CHAINS: AMERICANS FROM AFRICA (rev. ed. 1973); see also W.E.B.
DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935) (detailing the plight of blacks from 1860-1880);
JOHN FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED EssAYs 1938-1988, at 132-52 (1989) (exploring the
extent to which legalized segregation created a distinct world for blacks, a world inferior to that of
whites); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) (examin-
ing the experiences of slavery and freedom in colonial America through the lens of legal history).
114. Professor Alan David Freeman writes that:
From the victim's perspective, racial discrimination describes those conditions of actual social
existence as a member of a perpetual underclass. This perspective includes both the objective
[Vol. 45:349
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been earlier pointed out, it is an evil that takes its meaning from a som-
ber mosaic of oppression that stretches across the social landscape and
deep into history.
In the idiom of the black community, this concept of discrimina-
tion as a social practice was expressed through the image of "the white
man."" 5 This figure personified whites as a group, and implicitly por-
trayed racial discrimination as a group activity. While the figure of the
white man does not appear explicitly in legal discourse, the normative
baggage which he carried has found a theoretical vehicle in Professor
Fiss's concept of group rights.1 6
From this perspective society has been the wrongdoer, rather than
a particular employer, and it is a social phenomenon which must be
halted rather than a particular act.1 7 Thus, when discernable patterns
of racial exclusion exist, this approach emphasizes the development of
adjudicative frameworks which produce desired results for society as a
whole. This emphasis produces a hierarchy of values in which social
goals trump individual rights and substantive results outrank process
conditions of life-lack of jobs, lack of money, lack of housing-and the consciousness associ-
ated with those objective conditions-lack of choice and lack of human individuality in being
forever perceived as a member of a group rather than as an individual.
Freeman, supra note 31, at 1052-53.
115. The figure of the white man personifies the idea of racism as a social institution as
omni-present as whites themselves. The white man, at least until recently, occupied a highly prom-
inent place in black protest literature and political thought. See e.g., W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK 136 (20th ed. 1935) (speaking of the white man as he who binds both blacks and
himself with the "Black" and the "White Belt"); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X
30 (1965) (speaking of the psychological conditioning of blacks to racial abuse as an ongoing prac-
tice of the white man); HUEY P. NEWTON E' AL., THE BLACK PANTHER LEADERS SPEAK (G. Louis
Heath ed., 1976). Although generally speaking of the source of oppression in political and economic
terms, an underlying metaphor of racism as a cultural form surfaces in the text of what was known
as the Black Panthers' ten-point program: "We want an end to the robbery by the white man of
our Black community." The program then goes on to talk about "the racist" American government
and "The American racist." NEWTON, supra, at 3; see also DEREK WALCOTT, Ti-Jean and His
Brothers, in DREAM ON MONKEY MOUNTAIN AND OTHER PLAYS 81, 98 (1970). Walcott depicts the
West Indian folk tradition in which the existence of evil in society is explained through the figure
of "the white man," who appears literally as "the devil." However, "evil" here concerns something
specific: it seems to mean man's inhumanity to man, or more specifically, white society's inhuman-
ity to blacks. The mythology is an assimilation of a transnational black concept of racial politics
into symbolic terms.
116. Fiss has argued, proceeding from an ethical concern against caste, that the rights of
blacks as a group are prior to those of individual employers when they diametrically conflict. He
argues for a hierarchy of values in which the need to address historical imperatives takes prece-
dence over traditional contractarian precepts concerning individual rights. Fiss, supra note 22.
117. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In all of these cases
there is a deep concern for blacks as a group being walled off into a separate caste. These cases
have their foundation in historical and social interpretations, at least as much as in the specific
facts raised in the individual cases. The court normatively focuses on a concern about subordina-
tion of groups rather than on the equities between discrete disputants.
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values.118 Moreover, because this approach seeks to redress historical
patterns of exclusion and caste, it forces the court to consider social
context and social realities.
In a constitutional context 1 9 this concept of discrimination as an
historical, group wrong motivated the court in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.1 20  This same historically grounded notion of discrimination
reappeared in the Title VII context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.121 The
118. The substance/process dividing line between theories of equality tracks the dividing line
between theories of the state. Process-based theories assume a state whicht is neutral as to both
public values and outcomes of public debate. The state, through the lens of process-based theory,
is essentially a structure or framework for discourse empty of all but the grand procedural design.
See Kenneth Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State, the City of
Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI. L. REv. 989 (1989). In this model government strives
not for justice in a broad sense but for justice as fairness which, rather than guaranteeing particu-
lar results, guarantees that from an original position all outcomes are fair. For the seminal work on
this model, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980). Equality of opportunity, as the legitimate end of antidiscrimination guaran-
tees, appears as the marketplace analogy to justice as fairness in the political sphere.
119. There is no bright line in my view between the theoretical debate occurring within Title
VII doctrine and constitutional law. Technically, of course, constitutional claims only arise when
the state acts. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Moreover, Title VII focuses solely on
employment while equality claims under the Constitution fan out over a rainbow of concerns.
There are a host of other technical differences. But at a deeper level, the level at which we attempt
to conceptualize the meaning of equality, the two discourses are essentially continuous. For exam-
ple, the discourse about equality that occurred in the early constitutional cases frames our current
discussion. Also, as we see below, the assumptions of the intentionalist model, the baseline of con-
tractarian values, and the use of formalism as a means of interpretation transcend nominal bound-
aries of statutory and constitutional context.
120. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). There are two dimensions to the Brown Court's real
equality approach. First, the Brown Court shifted the mode of reasoning from the formalistic, text
based, mechanical jurisprudence of the past to a contextual, socially grounded approach. In Brown,
sociological data scorned as irrelevant by formalist thinking became not only relevant but crucial.
The focus of the inquiry shifted from a search for what the Fourteenth Amendment meant-the
Court in Brown simply said that the actual intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is unclear-to a
concern about social imperatives. The Court tried to protect the "hearts and minds" of blacks
from the destructive effects of segregation. Id. at 494. There is a strong instrumentalist theme
here. For the Brown Court, regardless of the Fourteenth Amendment's original intent, the continu-
ation of state enforced segregation was an unacceptable result.
Second, the Brown Court rejected the idea that equality or equal protection should be thought
about in merely positive legal terms empty of all but formal, negative prohibitions. The Brown
Court developed the notion that constitutional claims to equality have normative as opposed to
merely legal content: equality demands an inquiry into what is right as opposed to what the law
requires. In Brown the Court defined equality in terms of America's highest moral aspirations. It
interpreted equality as a demand to find congruence between the promise of racial fairness located
in the formal text and the contradictory historical experience of blacks. See Jones, supra note 106.
121. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Doctrinally, the Court in Griggs held that a test or job prerequisite
that disproportionately excluded blacks was presumptively illegal. Thus the good faith or bad faith
of the employer was irrelevant. The court reached this holding despite ambiguity in the text of the
act about the applicability of this form of exclusion. The Griggs opinion, like the Brown opinion,
finds its authority less in legal text than in an ethical concern about the historic predicament of
blacks. The Griggs Court, in striking down a high school diploma requirement which dispropor-
tionately excluded blacks, made reference to the history of segregation in education, and, implic-
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historical or group model provides a mechanism for conceptualizing a
way out of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"'22 which civil rights
laws present on the surface. Conceptualizing discrimination as an his-
torical and group problem allows for a linkage between antidiscrimina-
tion law and national progress. Under this approach, equality becomes
a path,123 while discrimination, as a group practice, becomes a "barrier"
which prevents advancement along the path.12 Thus, through the lens
of the group model, discrimination is a barrier not only to the advance-
ment of minorities, but also to the advancement of legitimate national
ideals.
Moreover, there is a notiofi of a final destination: the goal of dis-
crimination laws is to eradicate discrimination, to achieve "real equal-
ity,"'1 25 to usher in a society where the "sons of slaves and the sons of
itly, to the chronic caste-like status of blacks. Id. at 430. In Griggs as in Brown there was an
overarching concern with identifying and enunciating public values and responding to moral im-
peratives in the context of race.
122. The term "counter-majoritarian difficulty" originated with Professor Bickel. See
BICKEL, supra note 25, at 16. Civil rights laws are counter-majoritarian in the sense that they limit
the "liberty" of whites-the majority-to refuse to hire or associate with minorities. However, the
tension is illusory in the sense that core egalitarian norms within the concept of democracy render
a claim to a "liberty to discriminate" a contradiction in terms. Bickel argues that protection of
minorities is necessary for legitimation of democratic order. Id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Why
Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 280-89 (1983) (speaking of the indispensability of the an-
tidiscrimination principle to the creation of a community).
123. Much of legal language depends on an underlying metaphorical structure for its coher-
ence. This article noted earlier the use of notions of kinship as a way of modeling complex legal
relationships. Another source of the law's metaphorical structure is our physical experience. See
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2230 (1989). Winter writes that"[T]he human mind employs
basic, embodied experiences to construct more elaborate and abstract social meanings." Id. at
2231. The prototypical experience of moving through space, down a path for example, recurs as a
means of constructing many legal concepts. Adjudication, like equality, is also a path: there arejudicial "proceedings"; the plaintiff must carry a "burden"; the parties cite supporting grounds for
their "motions." Cf. id. at 2232. Thinking of legal concepts as a patchwork of cognitive imagery is
helpful because it demonstrates that law in essence is a concentration of symbolic forms, like po-
etry or music.
124. The Court in Griggs used this terminology:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the
statute ...
.... What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31.
125. In speaking of eradication of discrimination I include an aspiration within the discourse
of equality occurring in society at large. The legal text may help shape this discourse, but the
larger discourse about the nature of equality is at least as likely to shape our laws. The social
debate about the meaning of equality has always clearly included the goal of eradicating discrimi-
nation, but that goal has emerged only tenuously as a competing interpretation of equality within
the doctrinal debate.
Nonetheless, in the past, the Supreme Court expressly enunciated the goal of actually eradi-
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slaveowners will be able to sit down together at the table of brother-
hood."'126 There is an undergirding, anchoring vision 12 7 of what a just
society would be like. Thus, the idea of equality as a path relates to a
linear notion of history in which America's effort to eradicate discrimi-
nation is a point in the struggle to move beyond the moral incongruence
of the past toward its own modernity.
cating discrimination. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988) (plurality opinion);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (determining that "the purpose of
Congress [was] to assure equality. . . and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered racially stratified job environments"); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
126. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, speech given in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28,
1963) in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA EDUCATIONAL CORP., THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN HISTORY 175
(1969):
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its
creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal."
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of former slaves and the
sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.
127. The notion of "real equality" refers to something incapable of being conceptualized
merely as a negative prohibition or rule. Rather, it has always referred to a grand, poetic image of
a just society in which nothing mediates between legal institutions and the normative sphere. To
capture the purity of the real equality ideal, King spoke of his "dream." Id. To convey the same
idea another poet combined the images of an enchanted creature, a heavenly wood, and a notion of
rebirth:
That bright chimeric beast
Conceived yet never born,
Save in the poet's breast, .
Never may be taken
In any earthly wood.
That bird forever feathered,
Of its new self the sire,
After aeons weathered,
Reincarnate by fire, ...
If beasts like these you'd harry
Plumb then the poet's dream;...
Make it your wood and stream.
Countee Cullen, That Bright Chimeric Beast, in AMERICAN NEGRO POETRY 86, 86-87 (Arna
Bontemps ed., rev. ed., 1974).
Yet another poet tried to capture the real equality aspiration in a vision of a new world:
I dream a world where man
No other will scorn,
Where love will bless the earth
And peace its paths adorn.
I dream a world where all
Will know sweet freedom's way, ..
A world I dream where black or white,
Whatever race you be,
Will share the bounties of the earth
And every man is free, . ..
Langston Hughes, I Dream A World in AMERICAN NEGRO POETRY, supra, at 71.
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B. Formal Equality: The Employer-Centered, Conventional Model
of Discrimination
The formal equality model of discrimination seeks to remove dis-
crimination from its setting within broad historical and social patterns,
from its moorings in the actual experience of blacks, and confine it to
the narrow world of legal forms and classical legal values. The employer
literally takes us from the real world to a static world empty of all but
formalism. The employer, much like Louis Carroll's white rabbit, takes
us to an improbable place; he locates us within an abstract, one dimen-
sional, nineteenth century theory in which collective responsibility for
discrimination is unreachable.
The employer is quite simply a metaphor, a personification of com-
plex social interactions, a proxy for society itself. Aristotle spoke of
metaphor as transposition of the name.128 Discrimination is, at least
from a victim's perspective, an historical and social phenomenon. How-
ever, by speaking of discrimination as a product of the employer and in
turn the employer's wrongful intent, we transpose the name of a social
event to a psychological one. The notion that it is the employer's intent
that matters requires the assumption that the etiology of discrimination
lies in subjective decisions of discrete individuals. Implicitly, this con-
struct refers to the enlightenment idea that human subjectivity creates
human identity and worth.129 Cogito ergo sum: I think therefore I am.130
128. In Aristotle's deceptively simple characterization metaphor consists of giving the thing a
name that belongs to something else; the transference of name flows either from genus to species,
or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy. Thus, all metaphors
become what Ryle called "category mistake[s]." GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
The significance of this seeming mistake is that metaphors have as their ambition a redescription
of reality:
In giving to a genus the name of a species. . . and vice versa, one simultaneously recognizes
and transgresses the logical structure of language[].
[I]t involves taking one thing for another by a sort of calculated error. . . .To affect just one
word, the metaphor has to disturb a whole network by means of aberrant attribution.
[M]etaphor destroys an order only to invent a new one; and that the category's mistake is
nothing but the complement of a logic of discovery. ... [M]etaphor bears information be-
cause it "redescribes reality".
RICOEUR, supra note 54, at 21-22.
129. See BARTHES, supra note 38, at 142-43.
130. REN9 DESCARTES, A DiscouRsE ON METHOD 28 (1912). Classical liberal thought, of which
traditional equality jurisprudence is a subset, is largely premised upon this Cartesian postulate
about individual subjectivity as something objective. This contrasts with the "modern" notion of
the individual as a mere construct (a metaphor in Peller's terms):
The individual is not to be conceived of as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a
multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to
strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime
effects of power that certain. . . discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and consti-
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Thus the employer fiction assumes what Peller calls a "transcendental
subjectivity"; he views "[i]ndividual subjects as [the] ultimate source of
social relations, as prior to and constitutive of objective social struc-
tures."' ' In other words, the metaphor of the employer indefeasibly en-
trenches the autonomous individual in the discourse of discrimination
law.
Once the employer as "autonomous individual" is smuggled into
the discourse, he brings with him ancient common-law approaches to
individual liberty."3 2 Most significant is the common-law notion that a
private sphere for the employer exists coextensive with the ideal of lib-
erty of contract.133 Within this private sphere the law imposes no public
duties134 or objective moral standards' on the employer. Rather, equi-
librium is maintained by protecting the complete subjectivity'"6 and
tuted as individuals. The individual is not vis-a-vis power; it is, I believe, one of its prime
effects.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures of Michel Foucault, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 at 98 (Colin Gordon trans. & ed., 1980).
131. Peller, supra note 87, at 1154.
132. See e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915) (invalidating a statute aimed at pro-
tecting union members from discrimination on the ground that the law violated the "liberty" guar-
antee of the due process clause); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New
York law providing maximum hours and working conditions for bakers because this type of socio-
economic legislation interfered with individual "liberty" as protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
133. Essentially, under the common law, relations between employer and employee or master
and servant were analyzed as matters solely between the parties themselves. See Lochner, 198 U.S.
at 61; see also Duncan Kennedy, Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought In America, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOL-
OGY 3 (1980) (describing the central tendency of the classical common-law approach as an ordering
of the social world into spheres of total liberty for individual legal actors). But see Karl Kare, The
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1362-75 (1982) (tracing the
common-law public/private distinction to a notion of property ownership).
134. One theme of the common-law approach assumed the inconsistency of justifying legisla-
tive encroachments upon the "private sphere" on grounds of public duties or public interest. The
Court thus presumed that socioeconomic legislation resulted from partisan motivations:
[I]t is not possible in fact to discover the connection between the number of hours a baker
may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of the bread....
[F]rom the character of the law and the subject upon which it legislates, it is apparent that
the public health or welfare bears but the most remote relation to the law.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62, 64 (emphasis added).
135. The common-law approach also included a deep moral skepticism about the project of
objectively determining what working conditions were fair. For the Court in Lochner, such value
judgements were inevitably relative and speculative:
[I]t may be true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other
trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others .... There must be more than the
mere fact of the possible existence of some small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legisla-
tive interference with liberty.
Id. at 59.
136. The impulse to protect the traditional prerogative of the employer to be free from exter-
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privacy of the employment relationship. This laissez faire attitude to-
ward the employment relationship finds expression in the traditional
rule that the employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at. all.187 This framework in turn rests on basic
tenets of natural law. The central premise is that a court can only take
from an individual employer and give to a black individual where there
is a showing of individual wrongdoing on the part of the employer. 18
This premise necessarily requires a particularized inquiry.
This natural law framework which the employer brings with him,
injects a pervasive rhetoric of innocence"39 into the discrimination dis-
course. The rhetoric of innocence typically occurs in the context of af-
firmative action" °  or challenges to seniority systems.' 4 ' In these
nal controls in his decisionmaking process exerts a powerful pull against the very idea of antidis-
crimination law. Once the traditional prerogative of the employer is smuggled into the discourse,
determining the meaning of Title VII becomes at each juncture a balancing test. A court then
weighs the desirability of protecting minorities against the undesirability of intruding upon tradi-
tionally forbidden ground. Caselaw makes this tension explicit. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (speaking of the "delicate balance between employee
and employer rights struck by Title VII. . . ."); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239
(1988) (plurality opinion) (referring to the "balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives").
137. See Kare, supra note 133, at 1362; see also H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
138. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). The court stated that:
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. . . . [A]
law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice. . .they
cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime.
139. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990). For
Ross the "rhetoric of innocence" is an appeal to the emotionalism of whites through an implicit
narrative about "the innocent white victims." These figures, fictional figures according to Ross, are
the mechanisms which bring into the discourse the cultural baggage of whites-their resentments
and fears as whites. Id. at 299-301.
140. The figure of the "innocent white victim" enters the caselaw in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.) In Bakke, which addressed an affirma-
tive action program in the context of medical school admissions, Justice Powell spoke of "innocent
persons. . . asked to endure... [hardship as] the price of membership in the dominant major-
ity." Id. at 294 n. 34 (opinion of Powell, J.). This rhetoric carried over into the employment con-
text in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger, although
upholding a congressional affirmative action plan, required that such plans be narrowly tailored
and that the burden on innocent parties not be unduly heavy. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). In Wygant, whites challenged a collective bargain-
ing agreement implemented by a local school board which required blacks to be retained in favor
of more senior whites. Justice Powell, echoing Chief Justice Burger, expressed his reservations
about a "remed[y]" that placed a "burden" on "innocent persons." Id. at 281.
141. Seniority systems, which operate via a last-hired, first-fired principle, often operate to
freeze the status quo and perpetuate past discrimination. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In attempting to defend these systems, despite their racially
destructive effects, defendants have often explicitly relied upon the rhetoric of innocence. See Re-
ply Brief of the EEOC at 19, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) (No. 84-1656) (arguing that "according such preferential treatment to persons who have
382 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:349
settings, the natural law framework becomes the platform for an in-
verted moral world which paints whites as "innocent"' 142 victims and
blacks as undeserving recipients of benefits.
143
Further, defining discrimination as a result of the autonomous em-
ployer's individual intent empties discrimination of its substantive con-
tent, leaving only a procedural shell. Thus, discrimination occurs only
when an individual employer decides to treat two employees differently
because of race, sex, or some impermissible consideration. The rule im-
minent within this formal equality model of discrimination is that "like
should be treated alike.' 44 Because discrimination only occurs when
these tainted decisions qua decisions are made, this model implies that
a deliberative process is a necessary element. Thus, procedural or for-
mal equality becomes the goal, not real equality.
Under this procedural approach discrimination law becomes an at-
omistic, rather than a regulatory enterprise. 145 Its sole reason for being
no claim to a 'rightful place' in the employer's workforce necessarily deprives innocent third par-
ties of their 'rightful place'."); see also Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (No. 84-1999) (arguing that "[b]y awarding
superseniority to persons not shown to have been victims of discrimination at the expense of inno-
cent nonminority firefighters, the District Court has well exceeded the authority granted by Title
VII").
142. Of course, the word "innocent" conveys a particularly narrow concept of responsibility.
Innocence refers to the absence of intentional wrongdoing on the part of individual whites. There
is no inquiry into whether these same individuals have benefited from the privilege associated with
being white. See Ross, supra note 139, at 300-01.
143. The relegation of blacks to the role of nonvictims flows from a remorseless application
of the fault model: "Because an affirmative action plan does not require particular and individual-
ized proof of discrimination, the rhetoritician is able to . . . deny the victim status of
[blacks]. . . . 'Victim' status thereby is recognized only for those who have been subjected to par-
ticular and proven racial discrimination."
Id. at 301.
144. This concept of the antidiscrimination principle generally is accepted as self-evident.
See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., cbncurring) (characterizing
the inquiry in a discrimination case as whether or not blacks are treated like "similarly situated"
white employees); see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 539-
40 (1982) (assuming that "equality" means "people who are alike should be treated alike"). It is no
wonder that the notion of equality is empty for Professor Westen because he chooses to view the
discourse of equality from the barren landscape of a procedural model of equality. All interpreta-
tions "endow some perspectives, rather than others, with power." Martha Minow, The Supreme
Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 94 (1987). The "like
should be treated alike" paradigm, far from being neutral, focuses on discrete decisions of individ-
uals by suppressing an interpretation of equality focused on the condition of blacks as a group and
a concern that they not be oppressed. Cf. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race,
and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (arguing that equality represents a substan-
tive right of minority groups not to be subordinated by the majority).
145. The impulse to think atomistically about legal problems is linked to a limited concept of
language, called the referential theory of meaning. See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1970). Under this theory of language
words refer to specific things, e.g., specific decisions and intentions. Words resemble points in
space, dimensionless and unconnected to a grand scheme. This concept of language finds expres-
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is to provide a framework for policing violations of law.14 6 It follows
that attempting to use discrimination law to combat societal discrimi-
nation seems sentimental, mystical, and finally nonsensical. 14 7 Through
the lens of the formal equality model, the arc of the moral universe is
systematically skewed toward the status quo. Set aside programs that
affirmatively redress the chronic absence of blacks from certain indus-
tries appear as discrimination because they involve a decision to con-
sider race.14 8 Conversely, chronic stratification of minorities created by
the cumulative effect of societal racism appears as an irrelevant
fact-not discrimination-because it is not associated with a discrete
decision.149
The metaphor of the employer also works to transpose a legal cate-
gory and a moral one. Because the employer is positioned as the locus
of the discriminatory act, the employer makes possible an easy analogy
between discrimination and a tort, 50 or crime."' For example, our no-
sion within the formal equality model. In contrast, to comprehend the real equality model requires
an idealistic notion of language. Words are merely the skin of grand ideas which are integral to a
grand vision of a world without prejudice or racism. See generally Jones, supra note 106, at 30.
146. See Freeman, supra note 31, at 1054 (stating that "antidiscrimination law has thus been
ultimately indifferent to the condition of the victim; its demands are satisfied if it can be said that
the violation has been remedied").
147. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that "societal discrimination [is] an amorphous concept of injury that may be
ageless in its reach into the past . . . and timeless in [its] ability to affect the future" (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307)); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (stating in the related
context of voting rights that "[societal] discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, con-
demn governmental action that is not itself unlawful").
148. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 220 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (stating that "this language prohibits a covered employer from considering
race when making an employment decision, whether the race be black or white").
149. Thus, no matter how extreme the statistical picture, unless the exclusion of blacks-the
injury-can be traced to identifiable decisional causes, there is no "discrimination." See Croson,
488 U.S. at 479-80. Despite the general history of segregation in Richmond, Virginia, and despite
the extreme paucity of blacks (0.67%) in the construction industry, the Supreme Court held that
the city lacked a sufficient basis to have legislated an affirmative action plan. For a critique of this
strict causal approach, see generally Williams, supra note 28. This decision implies that social
inequities between blacks and whites are matters of fate. Others have also taken this position:
I believe that an individual's moral claim to compensation loses force as the nature, extent,
and consequences of the wrongs inflicted become harder to identify and as the wrongs recede
into the past ...
Indeed, as claims to compensation based on the past injustices of human institutions
become attenuated, they begin to compete with claims based on the vagaries of fate.
Brest, supra note 112, at 42. See also Lawrence, supra note 33, at 325 (arguing that courts some-
times assume that black exclusion is merely the result of black inferiority).
150. See, e.g., EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d. 936, 944 (7th Cir. 1988) (speaking of both "com-
mon law torts" and "statutory torts such as discrimination in violation of Title VII"); see also
Mark Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive Cases, 68
N.C.L. REv. 495, 537-38 (speaking both of "constitutional" and "statutory torts" of discrimination).
151. The document initiating the discrimination investigation is called a "charge". See
EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), 152. Moreover, courts often refer to an employer liable for discrimi-
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tion of a tort grows out of basic common-law doctrines that require a
showing of a causal nexus between a wrongful state of mind and a dis-
crete injury. 15 Similarly, discrimination becomes a particularized wrong
with identifiable actors, discrete decisions, discrete injuries and a causal
nexus between the employer's decision and the injury.153 This concept
of discrimination, narrowly confined within the contours of traditional
legal categories, obscures or denies the idea of discrimination as an
ongoing legacy of societal wrongdoing.
Thus, the Court, approaching discrimination as a traditional legal
category, imposes an a priori rule that there be symmetry between the
identifiable legal violation and the legal remedy.1 54 This requirement of
symmetry limits the concept of discrimination to a narrow inquiry
about the precise scope of the legal wrong and the precise scope of a
remedy. 155 Normative questions about the need to help minorities are
foreclosed by positive1 56 legal constraints on authority to intervene.
nation as "guilty" of discrimination. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Croson, 488 U.S. 469. Further, legal scholars often
speak of employers who discriminate as "perpetrators." See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 31, at 1052-
57; see also James Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All Out" School Desegregation Explained,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1502 (1990) (speaking of the court's aversion to a theory of remedies
designed to "punish the perpetrators" of discrimination).
152. As in a common-law tort, discrimination requires a causal nexus between intent and the
claimed injury. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
153. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
154. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (overturning a city minority set-aside plan because
there was a lack, of fit between the identifiable legal wrong and the remedy). This rule is by no
means limited to a constitutional setting. See, e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Worker's Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479-81 (1986) (requiring remedies for discrimination to be "narrowly
tailored" to the violation).
155. Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay For Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1829,
1847-48 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)). Kelman argues that "[w]e recognize what rights we have simply by see-
ing what remedies we are entitled to. Legal thought distorts our perception because we ... come
to believe there can be no problem, no significant interest to vindicate unless we can imagine how a
legal right might vindicate it." Id.
156. The intentionalist model repeatedly emphasizes that the discrimination concept lacks
moral content. Concomitantly, discrimination adjudications should occur devoid of moral inquiry.
This positivation of the discrimination concept flows directly from the categorization of discrimi-
nation as a "legal" term. Once we 1cate discrimination within the law category, we become en-
meshed in the classical concept of law which presupposes a dichotomy between law and morals.
The classic work in this field is JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND
THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1832), which advocates law as the command of the
sovereign. Austin's basic ideas resonate in "modem" efforts to determine what the legislature re-
ally intended or commanded. See also HART, supra note 91 (arguing that law is determined in
terms of rules of recognition). As Professor Dworkin has shown, however, positive theories do not
account well for what judges do and, thus, amount to "semantic" theories of law. See DWORKIN,
supra note 54, at 31-35.
The persistence of the classical view is linked historically to the post-Lochner view that objec-
tivity in the area of morals was unobtainable. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 873, 904 (1987). As a corollary, this moral relativism posits that public values are for politi-
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Both judicial and legislative efforts to help blacks are forbidden unless
they are precisely congruent with the common-law baselines of the
model.
Finally, the metaphor of the employer transposes the categories of
ideology 5 7 and fact. The employer leads us unerringly to the concept of
discrimination as an intentional act of an individual. This notion of in-
tentional discrimination, which exists only as a construct or corollary of
the formal equality model, is metaphorically transformed into a con-
crete "fact". 5 s The analogy of discrimination to a tort or crime implies
that discrimination is a discrete event, something that did or did not
happen, like a theft or an assault. 5 ' This is a classic instance of reifica-
tion.1 0 By making discriminatory intent appear as a factual quantity or
real thing, the formalistic model limits the nature and scope of our in-
quiry into discrimination claims.
We do not hear a discrimination claim as an expansive call to re-
cal rather than legal determination. See I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI: 1916-1935 at 249 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953) (stating
that "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."); cf. Drucilla Cornell,
Toward A Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 300 (1985) (view-
ing the problem as arising not from legal discourse but from culture, from the social malaise of
"decisionism"). Cornell explains:
Decisionism is the belief that moral propositions are founded only on the choices or commit-
ments of the individual. From the decisionist perspective no rational ground for any decision
exists, nor is there a rational standard by which to judge divergent choices. . . reason cannot
help . . . select specific values . . . it can only serve as a means to their attainment.
Id. Thus, the decisionist perspective believes these are instrumental reasons for retaining the law/
morals dichotomy. In this view the dichotomy retains an objective foundation for legal decision-
making. Ironically, this positivist framework cuts against itself by raising serious questions about
its own legitimacy. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS 98 (Thomas McCarthy Trans.,
1975). According to Habermas, "[t]he positivization of law means that legitimate legal validity...
can be obtained for any given contents, and that this is accomplished through a decision which
confers validity upon the law and which can take the validity from it. Positive law is valid by
virtue of decisions." Id. (quoting N. Luhmann, Positives Recht und Ideologie, in SOZIOLOGISCHE
AUFKLARUNG 180 (1970)).
157. See GEERTZ, supra note 36, for a discussion of the concept of ideology; see also HAY ET
AL., supra note 36.
158. "[T]he state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can
be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else." Edington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483
(1885).
159. The notion of discriminatory intent proceeds from an implicit objectivist understanding
of language. The notion of discriminatory intent implies first that discrimination is akin to the
intent to throw a rock or commit a fraud, and second that discrimination produces a discrete,
objective harm or injury.
160. Reification refers to the effect of metaphorical imagery which makes indeterminate or
abstract concepts appear as real "things." See Peller, supra note 87, at 1206; see also Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411,
2416-17 (1987) (exploring the ways language limits the horizon of our perceptions of the social
world).
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store a moral equilibrium. If so, the human imperatives would send us
outward to a historical and normative inquiry to determine an accept-
able outcome. The right result would be the arbiter of the rule. Rather,
by accepting discriminatory intent as a kind of historical fact, we direct
courts to look inward, to an inquiry into the employer's mental state.
We do not search for values in which to ground the results of a particu-
lar case, we search for "the facts" of what happened in the employer's
mind. This reification suppresses the debate from the normative ques-
tion-what is the right-to the legal question of whether a specific fac-
tual contention is true.
The metaphor of the employer thus creates three interlocking
images. Discrimination appears as a psychological phenomenon, a thing
that actually occurs because of the prejudice of the specific individual
employer. Discrimination also appears as a particularized legal wrong,
something identifiable, discrete, traceable to specific actors and wrong-
ful states of mind. Finally, discrimination becomes a plain fact, some-
thing capable of being determined objectively like the existence of a
murder weapon or of footprints in the snow.
C. Historical Echoes
The philosophy of the old South toward civil rights enunciated
during reconstruction resonates within the structure of this rhetorical
universe. The framework adopted by opponents of the Civil Rights Bill
of 1875 prefigures the formal equality model of discrimination. 6  This
"Old South framework" was a homespun version of classical liberalism.
Senator Hill expressed the core idea:
I must confess, sir, that I cannot see the magnitude of this subject. I object to this
great Government descending to the business of regulating the hotels and common
taverns of this country, and the street railroads, stage-coaches, and everything of
that sort. It looks to me to be a petty business for the government of the United
States...
Wihat he may term a right may be the right of any man that pleases to come into
my parlor and to be my guest. That is not the right of any colored man upon earth,
nor of any white man, unless it is agreeable to me. 16'
Thus, Senator Hill relegated government power to a distinct and differ-
ent plane than that occupied by individual choices about personal deal-
ings and association.
161. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat 335 (1875). The Act provided that "all persons"
would be entitled to the "equal enjoyment" of public accommodations, including "inns, public
conveyances on land and water, theatres, and other places of public amusement." Criminal penal-
ties were provided for violation of the statute.
162. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Senator Hill).
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Senator Charles Sumner, speaking for the Radical Republicans,163
expressed an opposing concept: "The Senator may choose his associates
as he pleases . . .That taste which the Senator has now declared be-
longs to him he will have free liberty to exercise always. . . .but when
it comes to rights, there the Senator must obey the law. "164
This historic debate anticipated the very dualities that frame our
"modern" discourse: What was the permissible scope of the antidis-
crimination principle with respect to individual liberty? Could the
claims of minorities in the nineteenth century context of access to pub-
lic accommodation be reconciled with the dichotomy between public
and private spheres, rights and tastes? Reconstruction era dialogue, like
today's, also contained an underlying debate about what was the proper
baseline from which to interpret the meaning of discrimination.
For Sumner, the context of substantive rights provided the proper
baseline. The core notion seemed to be a democratic imperative that all
citizens are entitled to free access to all public institutions. Sumner's
framework implied that civil rights protections have normative con-
tent."'6 In effect, he conceived of a floor of shared substantive protec-
tions and entitlements below which no person could sink. A more
fundamental concern that all citizens receive these minimal protections
preempted claims of privacy and boundaries of governmental power.
This view foreclosed procedural limitations by positing minority claims
as matters of substantive right and public duty.
For Hill, Sumner's formulation of the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranty' of equal protection of the law threatened to create a revolu-
163. The "Radical Republicans" represented the left wing of the post-bellum Republican
party. While Republicans generally shared a desire to make emancipation permanent, the "Radical
Republicans" wanted a more far-reaching social transformation. They were generally associated
with constituencies "centered in New England and the belt of New England migration that
stretched across the rural North." See FONER, supra note 5, at 228. "At the core of [Radical Re-
publicanism] were men whose careers had been shaped ... by the slavery controversy: Charles
Sumner, Ben Wade, and Henry Wilson in the Senate; Thaddeus Stevens, George W. Julian, and
James Ashley in the House." Id.
164. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Senator Sumner).
165. Sumner's framework echoes in the subsequent dissents of Justice Harlan in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) and in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In both cases Harlan seeks to vindicate claims of blacks by
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of citizenship as a substantive right requiring
a normative judgement about what minimum rights should be enjoyed by citizens.
166. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. (emphasis added).
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tionary new regime of black-white relations. In response Hill envisioned
federal law entirely circumscribed by a concept of dual planes of gov-
ernmental power. The federal government could not "descend" (in
Hill's terms) to regulate individual choice because such conduct could
only be reached from the plane of state authority. This bi-planar frame-
work, implicit in Hill's remarks, was made explicit by the Supreme
Court in the Civil Rights Cases:167
It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and property (which
include all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought to be pro-
tected against invasion on the part of the State without due process of law, Con-
gress may therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in every case;
and that, because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of
the laws, is prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws
for their equal protection.6 8
In modern formal equality jurisprudence the scope of federal laws
prohibiting discrimination is coterminous with the boundary between
federal and state government. Where the plane of federal governmental
power ends, there ends the scope of civil rights protections. 69 This the-
ory of separate planes of power'70 has become a mechanism for empty-
ing the discrimination concept of any substantive meaning. The
discrimination inquiry focuses not on result, but merely on who has ac-
ted at what level of authority. So long as there is no state action it does
not matter that black citizens, unlike white citizens, cannot have equal
access to inns, places of public accommodation, or employment.
This boundary between federal and state power is parallel to and a
167. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Senator Hill's arguments essentially became part of constitutional law
in the Civil Rights Cases. The court not only adopted Senator Hill's ranking of liberty over equal-
ity claims, but also adopted his conceptual framework that government power operated in a differ-
ent area than that of individual choice. The metaphor used in the Civil Rights Cases was a notion
of different levels, which equated with the notion of different spheres. Moreover, the Court, in
accord with Senator Hill, saw the starting point of the analysis as a procedural inquiry about the
proper limits of government power rather than a Sumner-Harlan starting point of substantive
rights.
168. Id. at 13.
169. This jurisdictional framework was invoked by the Rehnquist Court in City of Richmond
v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), where the Court held that states and cities, unlike the
federal government, lacked the power to enact affirmative action programs without a fairly particu-
larized history of prior discrimination. See generally Jones, supra note 106, at 36-43.
170. Croson is, in terms of legal method, a virtual mirror image of the Civil Rights Cases. In
both cases the Court used a theory of federal-state relations to trump claims of blacks to racial
exclusion. In the Civil Rights Cases notions of separate levels of state and federal authority frus-
trated federal efforts to protect blacks from discrimination. In Croson, the Court simply inverted
this scheme. The Court held that there were separate levels of authority under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that the states, unlike the federal government, lack the power to
legislate set-asides for blacks in the absence of identified prior discrimination. See Croson, 488
U.S. at 504. Both the Civil Rights Cases and Croson are at pains to place legal text expressly
protecting blacks within a rhetorical framework constructed entirely out of implied jurisdictional
constraints.
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reflection of a line of demarcation between public law and individual
liberty. Indeed, a division of the social world into public and private
spheres produced the normative source of jurisdictional constraints on
equality claims of blacks.17 1 In the private sphere, the sphere of
"tastes," the individual is supreme, whether it is an individual who
hires or one who invites a person into her "parlor". There is an implicit
ranking of individual liberty over equality claims of blacks as a group,
and an implicit positive notion of legal duties as not extending to mat-
ters of morality, particularly morality about race.
The "modern" employer oriented concept largely reentrenches
Hill's classical concept of discrimination: discrimination is something in
tension with, and necessarily narrowed by, individual rights. The syn-
thesis of this conflict produces a minimalist construct of discrimination
as a procedural concept empty of any substantive, affirmative duties
that might interfere with individual "rights".
The world view which reinforced this tension thus becomes reen-
trenched: The formalist employer model assumes Hill's boundaries be-
tween public and private spheres. The sphere of employment remains a
sphere of individual liberty. Moreover, in its deep proceduralism and
allegiance to positive notions of law and remedy, the model mirrors
Hill's skepticism about incorporating moral norms in public law. It al-
ters Hill's framework at only one point: discrimination is not absolutely
a matter of taste. But this alteration is fundamentally ambivalent: Gov-
ernment may not freely encroach on individual choice at will. Formal
notions of fault now mediate the line between government power to in-
tervene and individual rights, between private and public spheres.
Blacks are now freed from the rhetorical prison which limited equality
concerns to the plane of state action, but only to the extent that they
entered another rhetorical prison. Inquiry about whether the employer
is guilty matters. Inquiry about what is happening to blacks in the real
world, apart from a narrow inquiry about particularized guilt, does not.
IV. THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE: How THE EMPLOYER HIDES OUR
INTERPRETIVE CHOICES
Initially, the rift between the romantic fiction of discrimination as
something a discrete employer does and the reality of discrimination as
something omnipresent in the workplace is obscured by a classic confu-
sion of words and meaning.172 Lawyers and courts share a common lan-
171. See Klare, supra note 133, at 1360-75 (discussing the public/private distinction in labor
law).
172. "Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we ... meet
them in script and print." WirrGENSTEIN, supra note 145, at 6e. Wittgenstein focuses on the sub-
19921 389
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
guage for the concepts of equality and discrimination but differ as to
the meaning of the words. The duality in meaning reflects a duality of
social possibilities.
Normative recognition of the historical and social context of dis-
crimination would allow the discourse to bridge the gap between law
and human experience. Then society would have the vocabulary to ar-
ticulate the problems of blacks as a group, as an oppressed caste.
Armed with a vocabulary which is currently absent under formalism,
society ultimately would have the power to give meaning to discrimina-
tion law rather than leave it meaningless. Through a rediscovery of the
power of language, society might have the power even to transform
itself.
To posit discrimination as a problem of individual wrongdoing rep-
resents a very different normative vision of society: It is a society which,
under a regime of individual rights, provides only ephemeral procedural
fairness. Under this regime, we are frequently unable to express as a
legal wrong the undeniable reality of societal discrimination against
blacks.173 For blacks the bottom line of such a regime is "the white men
win."174 Moreover, whites lose too because legal language in such a soci-
ety has little legitimating power, and ultimately neither do legal
institutions.
We choose this debilitating normative structure when we interpret
the meaning of discrimination as an "intentionalist" construct. The
barrier is the invisibility of the interpretive choice. The notion of the
individual employer as "the problem" is founded upon a narrow con-
struct of discrimination which presupposes that words have fixed mean-
ings.175 Accordingly, discrimination has fixed meaning; it always refers
to a decision premised on an employer's biased state of mind. Once we
accept this imagery as objective, we have passed through a cognitive
door in which words, with all their artifice, become the masters of
perception.
As a workman's tool becomes part of his arm, something he ceases
to be consciously aware of, so too through constant use, does the myth/
jectivity and contextuality of meaning. The meaning of words, according to Wittgenstein, depends
on the speaker's use. A corollary here is that words do not have fixed meanings or essences, only
varying applications.
173. See supra note 143.
174. See Richard M. Fischl, Job Bias Barrage, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1989, at S12. Fischl
wrote: "Is this what the Reagan revolutionaries meant by a 'jurisprudence of original inten-
tion'-that white men win? That unfortunately is how it looks to one side of the 'v.' in employ-
ment discrimination cases." Id. Professor Fischl, my colleague, is writing about the consequences
of intentionalism in constitutional law, but I think his comments apply with equal force to the
intentionalist model of Title VII.
175. This represents again an objectivist assumption about language. See supra note 159.
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metaphor of the employer blend imperceptibly into the lawyer's back-
ground assumptions. The image of discrimination as a psychological
phenomenon, as a discrete event, as something akin to a common-law
assault comes to appear neutral and natural. 17 6 The unexamined rheto-
ric of the employer-his claims of innocence, his rejection of the con-
cept of group rights-becomes an unconscious barrier 177  to our
discourse.
A more fundamental problem results from the relationship between
the way lawyers interpret legal terms (like discrimination) and who
they are. Interpretation is merely a form or species of perception. Per-
ception is not a passive process but "a 'constructive act', not merely
reflecting but forming reality: 'the individual apprehends the resources
of reality (including language . . .) as he relates to them in'such a way
that they replicate his identity.' ,178 As such, "interpretation is a func-
tion of identity. T17  In interpreting the interpreter tends to recreate
176. According to Ernst Cassier, at least most, if not all, of what counts as knowledge is
constructed via a symbolic ordering of the chaos of human experience. 1 ERNST CASSIER, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 74-77 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1953). As applied to law, this works by
abstracting fragments of our experience and representing these abstracted experiences through the
"inner fictions" or metaphors active in our legal thought. Id. at 75-76.
The individual employer is a fictional representation of someone everyone has met or can
meet. The decision to discriminate is similarly a fictional representation of an act anyone can take
or imagine herself taking. The problem lies in our failure to distinguish between that which is
simply an image of how something happens and what actually happens. We simply presume that
what does not fit our image of discrimination is not discrimination. To some extent these images of
discrimination seem natural because they are part of our experiential ethos. Thus, the preemptive
character of these images is grounded in a false sense of symmetry. Because we assume, a priori,
that we have copied the real world in our symbolic fictions we will inexorably conclude that our
understanding of discrimination mirrors discrimination as it actually occurs.
Once we have succeeded in deriving images of the required nature from our past experience,
we can with them as models develop the consequences of our actions which will be manifested
in the outward world much later or as consequences of our own intervention. . . . The images
of which we are speaking are our ideas of things; they have with things the one essential
agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, but further agreement with
things is not necessary to their purpose. Actually we do not know and have no means of
finding out whether our ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than in this one
fundamental relation.
Id. at 75 (quoting H. HERTZ, DIE PRINZIPIEN DER MECHANIK 1 (1894)).
177. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 33. Lawrence argues that racial ideology is often unconscious
and that legal standards requiring conscious intent fail to account for unconscious racism. My
emphasis is less upon external legal institutions, i.e., legal standards, than upon language interior
to those standards and how language creates the foundation for our doctrinal difficulties. The law
not only ignores unconscious racism; rather, through the use of blinding rhetorical assumptions,
the law really can not see unconscious racism at all.
178. STEVEN MAILLOUX, INTERPRETIVE CONVENTIONS: THE READER IN THE STUDY OF AMERICAN
FICTION 24 (1982) (quoting Norman Holland, The New Paradigm: Subjective or Transactive? NEW
LITERARY HIST. 7, 343 (1976)).
179. Id. (quoting Holland, supra note 178).
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himself. s0 Thus, interpretation acts as a kind of mirror reflecting not so
much the real world, but simply who the interpreter is and his or her
desires and fears.
Under the intentionalist model, interpretation of the meaning of
discrimination does not reflect the actual experience of blacks, but
rather the patterns of anxiety and desire of the dominant group in our
legal culture. The factors which express themselves in this active inter-
pretive process are: (a) the need to avoid anxiety and instability; (b) the
desire to gratify wishes; (c) the need to shape the concept of discrimina-
tion within a set of social assumptions that reinforce the interpreters'
legitimacy.'' This interpretive transaction in which the interpreter rec-
reates him/herself is again unconscious and ultimately hidden. In effect,
interpretation and unconscious racism are intertwined.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PARABLE OF THE SOWER
Behold a sower went out to sow,
And as he sowed, some seed...
*.. fell on stony places, where they did not
have much earth; and they immediately sprang
up because they had no depth of earth.
But when the sun was up they were scorched,
and because they had no root, they
withered away.
1
1
2
Of course the difficulty with envisioning a new world is that we are
so ensconced in the old one that the past permeates our vision of the
future. The past is a regime of segregation, of racial caste, of a society
that loudly proclaims egalitarian values but rests comfortably with glar-
ing racial disparities. Our past and present, the modern and the bad old
days continue to blur and run together.
Through law we nonetheless have a way of freeing the moral imagi-
nation. In our institutions we can celebrate those aspirations we as indi-
viduals lack the personal nobility to embrace. We started down that
road during the reconstruction and we started again in the 1960s. For a
moment, in the sixties and early seventies the future took root in the
present, within the framework of the law. Antidiscrimination law really
180. See Norman N. Holland, Transactive Criticism: Re-creation Through Identity, 18
CRITIcISM 334, 340 (1976). Holland wrote: "We seem to be caught in a circular argument, but it is
not the argument which is circular-it is the human condition in which we cannot extricate an
'objective' reality from our 'subjective' perception of it." Id.
181. MAILLOUX, supra note 178, at 24. Thus, there is a Freudian dimension to the process of
interpretation. The interpreter not only transforms the text into something which affirms himself
but he suppresses from consciousness the mechanisms by which he achieves this gratification.
182. Matthew 13:3-6.
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began with the promise of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.18 3 that we would
talk of equality as a path down which society as a whole had to travel,
the promise that we would eschew the employer's intent and reach the
social consequences of discrimination. The promise of Griggs brought
the hope of redemption, a hope of a better world. The era of antidis-
crimination law essentially ended with Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.' a' The Wards Cove Court found virtual plantation style segre-
gation legally acceptable because it was not "born" of the employer's
wrongful state of mind. Somewhere between Griggs and Wards Cove
the word equality lost its meaning. In our civil rights law the past has
not merely become reentrenched in the present. The hope of a new
world, planted so well in Griggs, has withered away and died.'" 5
The statistics concerning how very few individuals gain tangible
victories under Title VII bear witness for that demise. The signs of it
whisper through my own experience. When I was an attorney with the
EEOC, I remembei' a conversation with the Executive Director of my
regional office:
Exec. Dir.: I'm glad that they're out there filing charges because otherwise I'd
have to get a job. (laugh)
• . . But they're pouring gasoline on themselves ....
By gasoline he meant that the claimants were likely to be the victims of
retaliation and that they in effect sealed their fate by coming to the
commission for help. It was a narrative of a civil rights enforcement
agency that operated as a trap for the unwary.
The signs of demise are also in the desperate efforts of the frag-
mented civil rights community to muster legislative support for a new
civil rights bill to help undo some of the damage to the Title VII stan-
dards by Wards Cove and other cases.18 6
183. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
184. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
185. See generally Jones, supra note 106.
186. On November 21, 1991, President George Bush signed into law S.1745, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. The key feature of the bill, and its main raison d'wtre, was to restructure the burden
of proof under Wards Cove. The bill does place the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove
business necessity. This does, if one engages in a literal interpretation, reverse the Wards Cove
allocation of the burden of proof that shifts to the defendant following the plaintiff's proof of
adverse impact. Of course the difficulty is that business necessity is not defined. The bill is an
improvement only if business necessity in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does mean 'necessity' and
not something less. This is not clear, however, because at least one legislator understood business
necessity to mean no more than a legitimate reason. See Civil Rights Act Focus Turns to Enforce-
ment, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at A19; (reporting that "Bush told federal officials to rely on a
legislative memorandum by Senate Minority leader Dole (R. Kan.) that says the bill affirms the
Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, a ruling that set forth the 'legiti-
mate business objective standard' ").
Nonetheless, even if the new law changes the burden that shifts to the employer, the threshold
problem in Wards Cove remains unremedied. The initial difficulty a plaintiff faces under Wards
1992]
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But the fundamental problem is not with doctrine nor with eviden-
tiary standards. These are surface phenomena. The problem is herme-
neutical and terminological. The problem is the lens that we use to look
at doctrine and standards. That lens is the word. We have given the
word "equality" a meaning so remote from the experience of minorities
that the law accepts situations which are racially unjust such as Wards
Cove plantation style segregation. The problem becomes the power of
the word to serve as a vehicle for ideology and majoritarianism. If all
racism disappeared from the face of the Earth, but we retained the text
of antidiscrimination law, there would be enough racism remaining
within the rhetorical structure of the text to replenish the earth. The
legislative straw, while appealing, cannot cure the problem of racism
within the very language of our discourse. It is language which con-
founds us, through metaphors of individualism and fault, through the
metaphor of the employer.
The language in which we speak about the employer as a real per-
son is indeed utopian. The notion that the employer has counterclaims
against minorities, has led us to think of both law and an ideal society
as a balancing effort, as attempts to reconcile commitments both to
equality and to common-law baselines. The law in this normative ten-
sion is viewed as the best of all possible worlds. If. only we respect the
employer's rights, maintaining fault-based notions which require wrong-
ful state of mind, then we can reconcile individual liberty with the
equality claims of blacks. The intentionalists' employer speaks a quasi-
theological language of illicit vs. innocent intent, appealing to an an-
cient impulse to judge, to separate the good from the evil, to disentan-
gle virtue from sin.18 7 Within this rhetorical utopia, intentional acts are
Cove, where a number of job practices - failure to post vacancies, word of mouth referrals, subjec-
tive interviewing practices - are all involved, is identifying which practice 'causes' the exclusion of
minorities. Unless the employer keeps formal records - which is precisely the problem in the
Ward's Cove context - it is essentially impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate "causation."
The new law does not cure this problem, it simply leaves to the discretion of a court whether to
excuse the plaintiff from this proof requirement by using a very vague standard. Again, everything
becomes simply a matter of interpretation and language. In the words of Shakespeare, the wheel
simply "comes full circle."
187. As Justice Holmes noted, the concept of sin provides the ultimate paradigm for all legal
wrongs. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 67-76 (1881). Holmes traced the arc of the law's
actual evolution from a notion of "wicked[ness]" down a path that culminates in a modern notion
of law as an instrument of social policy. For Holmes (and for me) "actual[] wicked[ness]" was
legally insignificant in itself, but had value as a proxy for external considerations. "It is an index to
the probability of certain future acts which the law seeks to prevent." Id. at 74. The modern
impulse has been to externalize our notion of responsibility with respect to the legal wrongs by
defining the wrong according to the needs of social policy and then constructing intent to fit the
policy. See John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility
In the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEo. L.J. 2845, 2872 (1988) (characterizing externaliza-
tion as the law's efforts to accommodate the more modern view that behavior, generally, is socially
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everywhere condemned and courts are exhorted to punish the wrongdo-
ers. Of course, when we use the intent standard to identify them we
generally never can find wrongdoers. Too bad. Meanwhile, racial strati-
fication continues apace. No matter. In the normative heaven, in which
the employer rhetorically situates us, chronic racial stratification and
exclusion-unless traced to intent-is perfectly acceptable. The em-
ployer speaks the language of equality but only in a particularly formal,
empty way.
We find ourselves in the interpretive position of the sower in the
parable who cast his seeds on rocky ground. Antidiscrimination law is a
morally conflicted, barren landscape. It is the rocky soil. Reform efforts
cannot bear fruit.
The fertile soil is a new language of equality in which we under-
stand finally that discrimination as a social problem requires group ef-
forts, group solutions, perhaps group liability in some cases. On the
road to transcendence our vision of society, not legalisms like fault,
must light the way. We need a language of equality in which discrimi-
nation comes to be identified as the absence of blacks. This language
must recognize the pattern of exclusion not as evidence of discrimina-
tion but as the thing itself. It must demonstrate a concern for equality*
as a poetic dream, not a creature of formalism. We need to be able to
articulate a vision of the world whole. Discrimination law, which in its
demise spoke incessantly of individual innocence and sin, must learn a
new, more secular, vocabulary, including terms for social evil and his-
torical wrongs. We must be able to articulate things as they are. We
must find a meaning of equality which is informed by the lived exper-
iences of blacks.
But so long as the myth of the employer remains within our dis-
course he will deceive us into thinking that the meaning pf equality is
fixed by his contractarian claims of individual liberty and right. So long
as the employer lives, he will imprison us in a realm of fixed meanings,
lifeless, changeless as a stone, where the seeds of a new society can find
no place to take root and grow. The employer must die for a new dis-
course of equality to be born.
determined). In criminal law, felony murder imputes constructive intent to anyone who kills in the
commission of a felony regardless of whether the felon consciously intended to harm anyone. In
torts strict liability holds people liable for harms, such as in the crash of an airliner on the basis of
powerful presumptions instead of basing liability on classical notions of fault. Interestingly, unlike
torts or criminal law the jurisprudence concerning discrimination has not begun to externalize
fault. Without an external notion of fault there is no way to conceptualize a collective as opposed
to an individualistic notion of responsibility.
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